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Because the quantity of land in the United States reservedfor
agriculturaluses is currently being diminished by increased development, states have enacted various statutory programs to preserve the agriculturaluse of that land. This articlefocuses on two
such agriculturalland preservationprograms, each of which has
been enacted in a number of states. It analyzes the conflict between these programs and the eminent domain power of states.
The author assesses the effectiveness of several alternative approaches in resolving the conflict between the policies of eminent
domain andfarmlandpreservation. Finally, the authorproposes
a more effective balancing approach to be used in managing this
conflict.
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INTRODUCTION

DECENT years have witnessed an enhanced awareness of the
vulnerability of this nation's finite agricultural land resources.
Officials at all levels of government have recognized that agricultural land, so essential for the production of food and fiber, faces
continually increasing demands.' These demands have resulted
in a pattern of conversion of productive agricultural land to urban
and other nonagricultural uses. 2 The extent of this conversion
can only be estimated. One study suggests that three to five million acres a year are converted from agricultural to nonagricul1. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1400, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (permanent
loss of farmland in the United States has made it increasingly difficult to meet
both domestic and export production requirements); GAO, PRESERVING
AMERICA'S FARMLAND-A

GOAL THE FEDERAL

GOVERNMENT

SHOULD

SUPPORT,

Rep. No. B-114833 (1979) (comprehensively analyzing the available data and
recommending that the Secretary of Agriculture coordinate efforts with the Soil
Conservation Service's study of potential cropland to aid Congress in establishing national land preservation goals) [hereinafter cited as PRESERVING AMERICA'S
FARMLAND]; ILLINOIS DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, THE ILLINOIS FARMLAND PROTECTION POLICY (1982).

2. A large number of sources discuss the conversion of agricultural land.
See, e.g., NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS STUDY, THE PROTECTION OF FARMLAND:
A REFERENCE GUIDEBOOK FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1981) [hereinafter cited as NALS GUIDEBOOK]; Keene, A Review of Government Policies and Techniquesfor Keeping Farmers Farming, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 119 (1979).
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tural uses; 3 another study suggests an annual conversion rate of
9.8 million acres between 1969 and 1978. 4 Although improved
technology has increased agricultural production, it is unlikely
that technological advances, such as improvements in fertilizers
and crop varieties, can continue indefinitely to compensate for
the loss of agricultural land, 5 particularly in light of increased demands expected in the coming decades. 6 Moreover, relatively little additional agricultural land can be put into production; the
cropland reserve in the United States stands at 111 million acres,7
of which only about 24 million acres could be cultivated readily.
Although some writers have disputed the seriousness of the
problem of farmland conversion, 8 many commentators believe
that the irreversible development of prime and productive agricultural land should be undertaken only with caution. 9 Several
rationales are typically recited to justify the retention of farmland
3. PRESERVING AMERICA'S FARMLAND, supra note 1, at 5. See also H.R. REP.
No. 1400, supra note 1, at 10 (suggesting that two to three million acres a year
are converted from agricultural to nonagricultural uses).
4. See Cook, The National Agricultural Lands Study goes out with a bang, 36 J.
SOIL & WATER CONSERV. 91, 92 (1981).
5. PRESERVING AMERICA'S FARMLAND, supra note 1, at 14-16 (even if technology can be relied on to increase productivity, such reliance results in a growing

dependence on high-cost energy and irrigation methods); Batie & Looney, Preserving Agricultural Lands: Issues and Answers, 1 AGRIC. L.J. 600, 603 (1980) (reviewing techniques that will result in farmland preservation); Wheeler & Harper,
In defense of farmland, 38 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERV. 1, 4 (1983) (although the
history of American agriculture is one of consistent growth, the future is less
certain in terms of per-acre productivity).

6. See Braden, Some Emerging Rights in Agricultural Land, 64 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 19, 24 (1982) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SOIL AND WATER RESOURCES
CONSERVATION ACT SUMMARY OF APPRAISAL PARTS I AND II AND PROGRAM REPORT: REVIEW DRAFT 14 (1980)).
7. H.R. REP. No. 1400, supra note 1, at 10.
8. See, e.g.,J. SIMON, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE (1981) (available land data as
a whole shows there is no cause for alarm). See also THE CROPLAND CRISIS: MYTH
OR REALITY (P. Crosson ed. 1982) (essays considering economic and supply/demand issues indicating that although increases in economic and environmental costs of agricultural production are inevitable, this trend will proceed
slowly enough to allow implementation of corrective measures); Cook, The National Agricultural Lands Study: In which reasonable men may differ, 35 J. SOIL &
WATER CONSERV. 247 (1980) (questioning farmland loss data); Fischel, The Urbanization of Agricultural Land A Review of the National AgriculturalLands Study, 58
LAND ECON. 236 (1982) (criticizing the National Agricultural Lands Study).
9. See, e.g., NALS GUIDEBOOK, supra note 2, at 16 (caution is necessary because the adverse effects resulting from loss of agricultural land spill over into
cultural and economic disruptions of various ways of life); SENATE COMM. ON
7

AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY, 9 TH CONG., IST SESS., AGRICULTURAL

LAND AVAILABILITY 283 (Comm. Print 1981) (research paper by A. DeVito, Con-

version of Agricultural Land to Developed Uses) [hereinafter cited as

AGRICULTURAL

LAND AVAILABILITY].
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for agricultural uses.' 0 First, these lands are viewed as necessary
to maintain supplies of food and fiber for this country, as well as
other nations."I Second, sustained agricultural production is important for local, national, and international economies. Third,
undisciplined development of agricultural land often encourages
the waste and expense of urban sprawl. Finally, retention of
farmland for agricultural uses helps to ensure the maintenance of
open space and the existence of a healthy environment.1 2 Having
recognized the importance of preserving agricultural lands, state
and local governments have developed a number of techniques
3
for minimizing agricultural land conversion.'
Although legislation preserving agricultural land is generally
directed toward protecting farmland from unnecessary conversion to nonagricultural uses, individual legislative schemes often
demonstrate specific goals. These goals suggest that agricultural
land protection has both long-term and short-term components.
For example, one objective of agricultural land preservation is to
14
provide for orderly development in metropolitan fringe areas.
10. The four justifications for farmland preservation that follow are listed in
R. JACKSON, LAND USE IN AMERICA 176 (1981), and Gardner, The Economics of
Agricultural Land Preservation, 59 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1027, 1028-29 (1977). See
also Batie & Looney, supra note 5, at 604-05.
11. United States farmers produce about 25% of the world's wheat and
coarse grains. A significant part of this annual grain production is exported. In
1980, United States agricultural exports totaled $39.7 billion, in contrast with
$18 billion in agricultural imports. AGRICULTURAL LAND AVAILABILITY, supra
note 9, at 217, 221 (research paper by D. McClintock, Global Significance of U.S.
Cropland).
12. R. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 176.
13. D. BERRY, K. BIERI, D. BOYCE, R. COUGHLIN, J. KOLHASE, E. LEONARDO,
STRONG, D. VINING, & K. WALLACE, SAVING

J. PICKETr, T. PLAUT, B. STEVENS, A.

THE GARDEN: THE PRESERVATION OF FARMLAND AND OTHER ENVIRONMENTALLY
VALUABLE LAND, Chs. IV-VII (1977) [hereinafter cited as COUGHLIN]; Batie &

Looney, supra note 5 (techniques include federal legislation, state public
purchase programs, and public regulation in the form of agricultural zoning and
transferable development rights); Keene, supra note 2, at 1229-43 (reviewing
state government efforts in developing promulgating regulations to encourage
farming, providing tax incentives, and acquiring interests in land agricultural
districts).
14. Legislation preserving agricultural land often contains a declaration of
legislative finding and intent. The Illinois Agricultural Areas Conservation and
Protection Act, for example, expresses the state's "orderly development" policy:
It is the policy of the State to conserve, protect and to encourage
the development and improvement of its agricultural lands for the production of food and other agricultural products. It is also the policy of
this State to conserve and protect agricultural lands as valued natural
and ecological resources which provide needed open spaces for clean
air sheds as well as for aesthetic purposes. Agriculture in many parts of
the State is under urban pressure from expanding metropolitan areas.
This urban pressure takes the form of scattered development in wide
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Legislation with this objective seeks to avoid the premature departure of agricultural operations from areas whose development
potential is uncertain or remote in time. Often the goal is not to
preserve agricultural land permanently, but only to keep agriculture in place as long as necessary to avoid undeveloped pockets.15
Such legislation is designed to reduce the costs of development to
society by avoiding situations in which productive land lies idle,
6
while random growth continues to consume agricultural land.'
The objectives fostered by other agricultural land preservation legislation go beyond this orderly development rationale.
Some legislative schemes declare a policy of maintaining and preserving farmland as a scarce and valuable natural resource, so that
it will not be lost to succeeding generations.' 7 Thus, rather than
belts around urban areas, brings conflicting land uses into juxtaposition, creates high costs for public services, and stimulates land speculation. When this scattered development extends into productive farm
areas, ordinances inhibiting farming tend to follow, farm taxes rise, and
hopes for speculative gains discourage investments in farm improvements. Much agricultural land in Illinois is in jeopardy of being lost for
any agricultural purpose. Certain of these lands constitute unique and
irreplaceable land resources of Statewide importance. It is the purpose
of this Act to provide a means by which agricultural land may be protected and enhanced as a viable segment of the State's economy and as
an economic and environmental resource of major importance.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, § 1002 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984). The New York policy is
nearly identical, but adds: "The constitution of the state of New York directs the
legislature to provide for the protection of agricultural lands." N.Y. AGRIC. &
MKTS. LAW § 300 (McKinney 1972).
15. In expressing this goal, two authorities have stated: "The goal sought is
to keep good farmland in farming until it is really needed for other purposes; in
other words, to block the destructive impact of speculation on farming but not
to make permanent city parks out of farmland." Conklin & Bryant, Agricultural
Districts: A Compromise Approach to Agricultural Preservation,56 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON.
607, 607 (1974).
16. Vacant lots are not only a waste of resources in themselves, but they
also contribute to a further waste of resources in transportation. More money is
necessary to develop roads, rails, cars, and buses; travelers spend more time in
transit. See C. HAAR, LAND USE PLANNING 683 (1977).
17. The legislative purpose section of the Connecticut Agricultural Lands
Statute illustrates this policy:
The general assembly finds that the growing population and expanding economy of the state have had a profound impact on the ability of public and private sectors of the state to maintain and preserve
agricultural land for farming and food production purposes; that unless
there is a sound, statewide program for its preservation, remaining agricultural land will be lost to succeeding generations and that the conservation of certain arable agricultural land and adjacent pastures,
woods, natural drainage areas and open space areas is vital for the wellbeing of the people of Connecticut.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26aa (West Supp. 1985). The Rhode Island Farmland Preservation Act espouses a similar policy:
The general assembly recognizes that land suitable for food pro-
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postponing farmland conversion so as to encourage orderly development, legislation adopting this rationale is designed to protect farmland permanently.
Yet another objective of legislation in this area is to ensure
open space areas in urban settings. 18 Open space areas with significant scenic and aesthetic value enhance the quality of life. In
addition, they constitute important community assets because
they add value to existing urban development. 19 Thus, the stated
policy of some agricultural land preservation legislation is to encourage open space areas to promote the public health, safety,
20
and general welfare.
The goals of orderly development of urban fringe areas, permanent farmland preservation, and open space for metropolitan
areas are pursued through various types of farmland preservation
programs. These programs range from voluntary schemes that
provide special benefits and legal protections, to mandatory land
use controls. Some programs give special tax advantages to farmers to encourage their continued pursuit of farming. 2 ' Others
give farmers in urban growth areas limited immunity from nuisance suits and ordinances that tend to restrict agricultural activduction in the state has become an extremely scarce and valuable resource. The amount of good farmland has declined so dramatically
that unless a comprehensive program is initiated by the state to preserve what remains it will be lost forever.
R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-82-1(a) (1984).
18. The shortage of open space areas in urban settings is in part a result of
the fact that owners of open space lands cannot charge for the environmental
amenities they create for others. See Batie & Looney, supra note 5, at 605.
19. Of course, the value of open space depends on its location: "[I]t seems
clear that . . . [the] value [of agricultural lands as open space] would be much
higher in Los Angeles County in California than in central Wyoming." Gardner,
supra note 10, at 1031.
20. The Missouri Open Space Conservation Act, for example, articulates
the need for open space areas as follows:
The general assembly finds that the rapid growth and random
spread of urban development is encroaching upon, impairing, or eliminating, many open areas and spaces of various sizes and character, including many such sites having significant scenic or esthetic values,
which areas and spaces, if preserved and maintained in their present
open state, would constitute important physical, healthful, esthetic or
economic assets adding to the value of existing or impending urban
and metropolitan development.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 67.870 (Vernon 1984).
21. See Dunford & O'Neill, An Analysis of Alternative Approaches to Estimating
Agricultural Use-Values, 3 AGRic. L.J. 285 (1981); Pimentel & Pimentel, Ecological
Aspects of Agricultural Policy, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 555 (1980). Because farmers'
property holdings are usually large in relation to their income, most of these
programs assess land at its farm use value to maintain property taxes at a manageable level. Pimentel & Pimentel, supra, at 559.
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ity. Feedlot statutes and right to farm laws, for example, are
designed to protect the farm community from the nuisance litigation precipitated by an influx of newly rural, but urban-thinking,
neighbors. 22 Other programs, like zoning laws that permit only
23
agricultural use, are mandatory.
This article focuses on two agricultural land preservation
programs that are largely voluntary-agricultural districts and
conservation easements. Each type of program has been enacted
in a number of states in an attempt to create reserves of land
where agriculture is the primary activity. Each program restricts
the land use of participating landowners, and each offers incentives for participation. Agricultural districts, are designed to prevent the premature departure of farming from the urban fringe by
offering special protections to farmers who voluntarily choose to
participate. The districts are established for specified time periods, and thus foster the orderly development objective of farmland preservation schemes.24 Conservation easements (and
several closely related programs),2 5 by contrast, are usually intended to ensure the long-term preservation of farmland for agricultural use. The right to develop the land is separated
permanently from ownership of the land itself. Thus, neither the
farmer nor any future owners of the agricultural land may convert
the property to nonagricultural uses.
Both agricultural districts and conservation easements can be
considered legislative reflections of a state public policy that attempts to ensure that farmland remains in agricultural use, either
permanently or for a more limited period of time. Occasionally,
however, the public policy of farmland preservation may conflict
with another public policy, that of making land available to government entities for public use through the power of eminent domain. Land protected by an agricultural district or a conservation
easement, for example, may be desirable for interstate highway
expansion or another public project. In such situations, the two
22. See Grossman & Fischer, Protecting the Right to Farm: Statutory Limits on
Nuisance Actions Against the Farmer, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 95 (discussing the interrelationships between principles of nuisance law, right to farm statutes, environmental laws, and other state laws).
23. For a discussion of agricultural zoning, see Batie & Looney, supra note
5, at 612-17; Zoning for Agricultural Preservation,36(4) LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG.
3 (1984), [hereinafter cited as Zoning].
24. For a discussion of orderly development at the urban fringe, see supra
note 14 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of conservation easement schemes, see infra notes 6273 and accompanying text.
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public policies-farmland preservation and eminent domainmay become incompatible. The conflict may be exacerbated
when neither the eminent domain statute nor the farm preservation law provides a resolution to the incompatible policies.
This article is intended to analyze the conflict between the
policies of eminent domain and farmland preservation. It is not
the purpose of this article to examine in detail either the principles of eminent domain or the effectiveness of individual farmland preservation schemes. Nevertheless, it is important to
remind the reader of the essentials of eminent domain and the
operation of the relevant farmland protection schemes as background to the analysis in the concluding section of this article.
Thus, the article first reviews agricultural district laws and their
provisions. It also reviews conservation easement programs and
related programs designed to preserve agricultural land permanently. It then presents a brief overview of eminent domain law.
The article next examines the conflict between the eminent domain power and state policy regarding agricultural land preservation, as effectuated in agricultural districts and conservation
easements. Finally, the article suggests a balancing approach to
be used in managing this conflict.
II.

FARMLAND PROTECTION SCHEMES

A.

Agricultural Districts

A number of states have responded to the problem of undisciplined urban sprawl by authorizing the formation of agricultural
districts.2 6 The purpose of these districts (sometimes called agricultural areas) is to prevent the premature cessation of farming
26. See Williamson Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51200-51295 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1984) (authorizing local programs with agricultural preserves); Agricultural Areas Conservation and Protection Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5 §§ 100 1-1020
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984), IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 93A.1-.13 (West Supp. 1984);
Ky. REV. SWAT. § 262.850 (Supp. 1984); MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 2-501 to -515
(Supp. 1983); Metropolitan Agricultural Preserves Act, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 43H.01-. 18 (West Supp. 1984) (authorizing programs in 7 counties); Agriculture Retention and Development Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:1C-11 to -37 (West
Supp. 1984); N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 300-307 (McKinney 1972 & Supp.
1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 929.01-.05 (Page Supp. 1983); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 16, §§ 11941-11947 (Purdon Supp. 1984); Agricultural and Forestal Districts
Act, VA. CODE §§ 15.1-1506 to -1513.8 (1981 & Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 91.11-.23 (West Supp. 1984).
Some states, in categorizing certain land as "agricultural districts," do not
refer to the type of voluntarily organized areas encompassed by this article. Hawaii, for example, has a comprehensive land-use plan in which certain areas are
labeled "agricultural districts." HAWAII REV. STAT. § 205-2 to -4.5 (1976 &
Supp. 1983). Oregon also has a comprehensive land-use scheme. See Furuseth,
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on the urban fringe by offering a number of protections to the
agricultural operations of the farmers in that fringe area. 27 These
protections are designed both to offset the uncertainties that
farmers face in the speculation-dominated atmosphere of urban
growth and to alleviate some of the problems a farmer encounters
when the character of the surrounding community changes from
28
rural to urban.
Although the extent and timing of commercial development
are hard to predict, when rural land eventually passes to urban
use, it usually commands a price in excess of its value as farmland.2 9 Thus, a farmer whose land is ripe for development may be
hestitant to make any substantial new investment in the farm operation when that investment would add little or no increment to
the sale price.3 0 Yet, without new investment and the improved
technology that investment allows, the farmer may be placed at a
competitive disadvantage with other producers. Conversely, if a
number of farmers fail to reinvest, the area may lose much of the
infrastructure, such as farm supply and implement dealers, that is
needed to support viable farming operations. Finally, in an urban
fringe area characterized by land speculation and increasing
property values, the farmer without some special tax relief 1 may
pay higher property taxes than a farmer in a rural area.
Ultimately, when the uncertainty, inconvenience and expense
become too great, the farmer may become discouraged, quit
farming, and sell to developers. If the land is not ripe for development, the result is inefficiency, because the once-productive
farmland lies idle. Portents of this scenario helped to engender
agricultural districting laws, which were enacted to reduce the uncertainties experienced by farmers and to encourage continued
Update on Oregon's Agricultural Protection Program: A Land Use Perspective, 21 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 57 (1981). Such programs are not the focus of this article.
27. For a general discussion of agricultural districts, see Myers, The Legal
Aspects of Agricultural Districting, 55 IND. L.J. 1 (1979); NALS GUIDEBOOK, supra
note 2, at 76-97; Conklin & Bryant, supra note 15; Geier, AgriculturalDistricts and
Zoning: A State-Local Approach to a National Problem, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 655 (1980).
28. See Conklin & Bryant, supra note 15, at 609-12.
29. Id. at 608. A farmer in this situation might face such problems as rising
costs and increased governmental activity. Id.
30. Speculation and uncertainty can be most damaging to farmers who
must invest heavily in real estate improvements that have little or no value for
nonfarming purposes. Id.
31. For a recent discussion of preferential taxation, see Duncan, Toward a
Theory of Broad-based Planningfor the Preservationof Agricultural Land, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 61, 78-96 (1984) (examining the various preferential taxation
programs).
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farming of productive agricultural land. These laws attempt to
direct new growth toward existing vacant parcels in semisuburbanized areas, so as to achieve the goal of efficient
32
development.
Most agricultural districting laws have been enacted since
1965. Although these statutes differ from state to state, they tend
to follow a rather similar pattern. The following account of the
formation of an agricultural district, based on the Illinois law, is
typical. 33 Any owner or owners of land may submit a proposal for
the creation of an agricultural district to the local governing body,
usually the county board. The proposal must include a description of the proposed district and indicate its boundaries. No land
can be included in an agricultural district without the owner's
consent, 34 and a proposed district may not be smaller than 500
acres.3 5 After receipt of a petition, the county must publish notice of a public hearing to consider the proposed agricultural district. 36 The county must act to reject or approve the district
within forty-five days after submission of the proposal. 37 If approved, the agricultural district is established initially for a tenyear period,3 8 during which time agriculture is to be the only activity conducted on land within that district.
Once a district is established, any person may petition the
county board to withdraw land from the district. 3 9 The withdrawal petition follows a procedure similar to the creation petition. 40 If an individual withdraws, the rest of the district
32. Conklin & Bryant, supra note 15, at 608.
33. The account is based on the Illinois Agricultural Areas Conservation
and Protection Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, §§ 1001-1020 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1984). For a discussion of a recent amendment to this law, see infra note 311.
34. Id. § 1005.
35. Id. Some states, including Wisconsin, Minnesota, California, and Pennsylvania, make agreements with farmers on an individual basis. The acreage requirement in these states ranges from 10 to 40 acres. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 51222 (West Supp. 1985) (10 acres of prime agricultural land; 40 acres if
otherwise); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 473H.03, 473H.05 (West Supp. 1985) (40
acres).
36. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, § 1006 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984).
37. Id. § 1010.
38. Id. § 1005. It is interesting to note that the New York law has been
amended recently to allow agricultural district formation for initial periods of 8,
12, or 20 years. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAw § 303 (McKinney Supp. 1984).
39. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, § 1012 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984).
40. Id. § 1013. For example, once the county receives the petition for withdrawal, it must publish notice of the petition. This notice must contain a brief
description of the land and a statement of the proposed nonagricultural use of
the land. Id.
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continues undisturbed. A district may be dissolved completely after the expiration of the original ten-year term if two-thirds of the
landowners within the district request dissolution. 41 If the landowners do not request dissolution, the district remains intact as
42
originally constituted for eight more years.
In order to promote such district formation, protections are
offered to farmers who organize agricultural districts. Although
these protections vary from state to state, several types of provisions are typical. 4 3 First, farmers in an agricultural district can
expect relief from inflated property taxes because farmland will
be assessed as if farming were its highest and best use. 44 In effect,
the development potential of the farmer's land is not taxed.
Although differential assessment programs for farmland taxation
are not unique to agricultural district programs, 45 reduced taxes
are one way that agricultural district laws may encourage farmers
46
to rededicate themselves to agriculture.
Second, farmers within an agricultural district can also expect
protection from local ordinances that restrict and regulate farming activities and structures. The growth of residential subdivisions in areas that were at one time truly rural can evoke friction
between the newcomers and the farmers. The new neighbors
may take offense at common elements of farm life: odors from
farm animals and fertilizers, dust, flies, noise from animals and
machinery, pesticide and herbicide spraying, and slow moving vehicles. 4 7 With an influx of urban-minded people, farmers may en41. Id. § 1017.
42. Id. § 1016.
43. See, e.g., N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTs. LAW §§ 301-307 (McKinney 1972 & Supp.
1984).
44. Differential assessment is designed to benefit farmers, not to encourage
speculation. But see Stradley, Differential Assessment for Agricultural Land Creates a
Tax Haven for Speculators, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 848 (1982) (examining the differential tax system in Florida which encourages development of farmland through
speculation). To discourage speculators from investing prematurely in farmland
so as to enjoy reduced tax burdens, conversion penalty and rollback tax provisions have been included in many statutes. When a farm is converted to nonfarm use, the amount of the tax reduction in previous years may become due.
For representative provisions, see N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAw § 305(l)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11946 (Purdon Supp. 1984).
45. For a discussion of differential assessment programs, see Duncan, supra
note 31.
46. At least two courts have considered and upheld preferential tax treatment for agricultural land, independent of the existence of any agricultural district. See Hoffmann v. Clark, 69 I1. 2d 402, 372 N.E.2d 74 (1977); Elwell v.
County of Hennepin, 301 Minn. 63, 221 N.W.2d 538 (1974).
47. See Grossman & Fischer, supra note 22, at 97.
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counter a reduction in their influence on local government. 48 As
a result, the local government may enact ordinances unfavorable
to the farming community, thus forcing farmers out of the area
prematurely. To prevent this situation, agricultural district statutes often limit the powers of local government to regulate agriculture within the districts, unless the regulation bears a direct
49
relationship to the public health or safety.
Agricultural district statutes also typically limit the authority
of special purpose districts to impose ad valorem property taxes on
land within the districts. 50 Landowners are often taxed on a peracre basis to finance improved public services such as power,
light, sewer, water and nonfarm drainage. Although farmers benefit from these improvements, they often finance a disproportionate share of the costs simply because of the land-intensive nature
of farming. By alleviating this potential burden, agricultural districts encourage farmers within the districts to continue farming
until their land is needed for immediate development.
Some agricultural district laws also contain provisions that direct state departments and agencies to execute their programs in
ways that encourage and support the continuance of agricultural
districts. 51 The practical effect of these provisions is not entirely
48. See CourHLIN, supra note 13; D. BERRY, E. LEONARDO & K. BIERI, THE
FARMER'S RESPONSE TO URBANIZATION: A STUDY OF THE MIDDLE ATLANTIc
STATES 17 (Regional Science Research Institute Paper No. 92 (1976)).
49. Virginia's provision is representative of those in this area:
No local government shall exercise any of its powers to enact local
laws or ordinances within an agricultural or forestal district in a manner
which would unreasonably restrict or regulate farm structures or forestry and farming practices in contravention of the purposes of this
chapter unless such restrictions or regulations bear a direct relationship
to public health or safety ....
VA. CODE § 15.1-1512B (1981). See also N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 305(2) (McKinney Supp. 1984). Because the Virginia provision prohibits only unreasonable regulations that do not directly affect public health and safety, it merely
defines the police power of local governments. It is likely to do little to limit the
powers of local governments to pass ordinances regulating odors from farm activities. See Myers, supra note 27, at 35. But see Grossman & Fischer, supra note
22.
50. Iowa's pertinent provision is typical:
A political subdivision or a benefited district providing public services such as sewer, water, or lights or for nonfarm drainage shall not
impose benefit assessments or special assessments on land used primarily for agricultural production within an agricultural area on the basis of frontage, acreage, or value, unless the benefit assessments or
special assessments were imposed prior to the formation of the agricultural area, or unless the service is provided to the landowner on the
same basis as others having the service.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 93A.10 (West 1984).
51. A representative policy directive is found in the Kentucky statute:
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clear. But, as this article will later demonstrate, the potential interactions between public agencies and agricultural districts raise
52
significant issues.
Planners have long recognized that controlled placement of
major public works influences land development. 5 3 As one group
has stated, "Itihe provision of water supply or electric power directly influences the direction and timing of urban development;
and the availability of sewers ...encourage[s] settlement and urbanization .... The withholding of these services may be almost
as important a tool for the preservation of open spaces."' 54 One
state, acknowledging the importance of the placement of water
and related utilities in directing development, has gone beyond
merely limiting the imposition of ad valorem property taxes for
special purposes; it has also prohibited the development of public
55
sewer and water systems within agricultural districts.
It shall be the policy of all state agencies to support the formation
of agricultural districts as a means of preserving Kentucky's farmlands
and to mitigate the impact of their present and future plans and programs upon the continued agricultural use of land within an agricultural district.
Ky. REV. STAT. § 262.850(12) (Supp. 1984).
Similar provisions appear in other types of statutes not related to the creation or regulation of agricultural districts, as defined in this article. See, e.g., Delaware Agricultural Lands Preservation Act of 1981, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3,
§§ 901-905 (Supp. 1982); Cf Illinois Farmland Preservation Act, ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 5, §§ 1301-1308 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984) (articulating a policy of farmland
protection by state agencies). For a further discussion of these protective policies, see infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
52. See infra Part IV.
53. Williams, The Three Systems of Land Use Control, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 80,
96 (1970) (examhining the effectiveness of existing systems of land use control
and suggesting basic principles to be followed in reorganizing public control
systems).
54. City & Regional Parks & Playgrounds Comm'n, Am. Soc'y of Landscape
Architects, Preservation of Open Spaces, 48 LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTURE, 82, 88
(1958). See also Comment, Utility Extensions: An Untested Control on Wisconsin's Urban Sprawl, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1132, 1134 (sewage extension programs should be
included in any comprehensive land use program).
55. Minnesota's Metropolitan Agricultural Preserves Act provides:
Notwithstanding Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 429, construction
projects for public sanitary sewer systems and public water systems
benefiting land or buildings in agricultural preserves shall be prohibited. New connections between land or buildings in agricultural preserves and sanitary sewers or water systems shall be prohibited. Public
sanitary sewer or water systems built in the vicinity of agricultural preserves are deemed of no benefit to the land and buildings in agricultural preserves.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473H. 11(West Supp. 1984). Application of this Act is restricted to land in metropolitan areas that is designated through local and regional planning for long-term agricultural use. Id. § 473H.01. See Duncan, supra
note 31, at 102-04.
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Several agricultural district statutes restrict the use of agricultural district land for such public development projects as highways and utilities. These statutes commonly include provisions
that modify, but do not totally eliminate, the power of public
agencies to acquire land within agricultural districts by condemnation. A later section of this article focuses in detail on these
56
provisions.
In spite of all the benefits and incentives that agricultural districts offer farmers, the districts do not prevent the ultimate conversion of farmland to urban uses. 57 Rather, they function
primarily to keep agriculture in place until the protected farmland
is truly needed for immediate urban growth, thereby fostering
more orderly and efficient development. Indeed, one commentator has criticized agricultural districting legislation for not going
far enough: "It is as though the legislature created an elaborate
device for metering the consumption of agricultural lands by cities, while forgetting that people may starve for lack of the farm58
land that cities so rationally consumed."
As the description of the process of agricultural district formation has indicated, participation in the districts is generally voluntary. This noncoercive character of agricultural districting has
been criticized. One criticism focuses on instances in which developers have failed to use existing vacant parcels of land, and
instead have chosen to develop beyond the agricultural districts
on land that is even more remote from urban centers. 59 Such
"leapfrogging" is possible because the voluntary nature of the
districts permits landowners receptive to sale to refuse to join a
district. Yet the noncoercive aspects of the legislation were probably necessary for the political acceptability of districting. 60 In
general, voluntary programs are viewed more favorably by farm56. See infra notes 178-204 and accompanying text.
57. See Batie & Looney, supra note 5, at 621 (incentives in addition to the
formation of agricultural districts will be needed to preclude conversion to urban use).
58. Widman, The New Cancellation Rules Under the Williamson Act, 22 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 589, 647 (1982). Another authority has suggested that legislatures not rely solely on agricultural districting programs: "Legislatures contemplating agricultural districting initiatives might be better encouraged to consider
the acts as merely the first stage in the development of a comprehensive program for the preservation of agricultural resources." Myers, supra note 27, at 38.
59. Batie & Looney, supra note 5, at 611.
60. Conklin & Bryant, supra note 15, at 607. For example, although the
New York State Legislature failed to enact into law bills mandating farm value
assessment and agricultural zoning, it subsequently instituted an agricultural
districting program as a politically feasible compromise. Id.
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ers than are mandatory programs, a factor that may be instrumental in the initial enactment of any farmland preservation law.
Furthermore, the districting programs, despite their voluntary
character, probably have been successful in reducing the uncertainty under which farmers make their investment decisions.
Thus, these programs have, at least in the short run, contributed
to the preservation of agricultural land in metropolitan growth
61
areas.
B.

Restrictions on Development

Agricultural districts provide a means of keeping farmland in
agricultural production for specific periods of time, while ensuring that the farmer continues to hold title to the property. Another type of legislative scheme is designed to protect farmland
over the long term, while at the same time allowing the farmer to
maintain a property interest in the land. Programs in this latter
category restrict the farmer's right to develop the land commercially, but leave intact the right to use the property for agricultural purposes. These programs have various titles, such as
conservation easements, land preservation easements, deed restrictions, and purchase of development rights. 62 Despite the va61. Participation in these programs has not been a major problem in New
York:
About 4.7 million acres have been placed within the 336 agricultural districts formed in the six years since the law was passed, and district formation continues. Initially, districts were formed principally in
rural areas where farmers felt threatened by proposed government
projects or encroaching recreationists. But within recent years a substantial amount of urban fringe acreage has been placed in districts. As
of August 1976 approximately 28.9 percent of all district acreage was
located in 16 of the state's 21 counties classified as Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas outside of New York City; and 23.4 percent of all
districted acreage was within 25 miles or less of an urban area of over
50,000 population ....
Conklin & Lesher, Farm-Value Assessments as a Means for Promoting Efficient Farming
in Urban Fringes, 42 J. AM. Soc'Y FARM MANAGERS & RURAL APPRAISERS 42, 45
(1978) (footnote omitted). See also Batie & Looney, surpa note 5, at 621; Conklin
& Bryant, supra note 15, at 611-12.
Local interest in Kentucky's agricultural districting program is strong.
Thirty-one districts have been formed thus far. They encompass 37,972 acres of
land owned by 424 landowners. The largest district consists of almost 10,000
acres owned by 60 different landowners. Lexington Herald-Leader, Aug. 17,
1984, at A11.
62. For information about these programs, see generally R. DUNSFORD,
PRESERVING

FARMLAND

BY PURCHASING

DEVELOPMENT

RIGHTS

(Congressional

Research Service, Rep. No. 84-116 ENR,June 25, 1984); Coughlin & Plaut, LessThan-FeeAcquisitionfor the Preservationof Open Space: Does It Work ?, 44 J. AM. INST.
PLANNERS 452 (1978); Fenner, Land Trusts: An Alternative Method of Preserving Open
Space, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1039 (1980); Newton & Boast, Preservation by Contract:
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riety of labels and certain differences in the operation of the
programs themselves, these programs share the goal of preserving productive agricultural land and open space for succeeding
generations. 6 3 To that end, they attempt to restrict the right of
the fee simple owner "to develop, construct on, sell, lease or
otherwise improve the agricultural land" 64 in ways that are incon65
sistent with continued agricultural use.
A number of states have enacted programs authorizing
purchase of development rights or conservation easements on selected parcels of agricultural land. 6 6 In addition, some local proPublic Purchase of Development Rights in Farmland,4 COLUM.J. ENVTL. L. 189 (1978);
Peterson & McCarthy, FarmlandPreservation by Purchase of Development Rights: The
Long Island Experiment, 26 DE PAUL L. REV. 447 (1977); Comment, Agricultural
Land Preservation: Washington's Approach, 15 GONZ. L. REV. 765, 786-91 (1980).

63. See, e.g.,

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§§ 22-26aa (West Supp. 1985). A

number of states have laws providing for open-space easements, not particularly
directed toward agricultural land. See, e.g.,
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51050-51097
(West 1983); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:8A-1 to -55 (West 1979).
64. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-26bb(d) (West Supp. 1985).
65. The New Hampshire statute defines agricultural land development
rights in the following manner:
"Agricultural land development rights" means the rights of the fee
simple owner of agricultural land to construct on, sell, lease or otherwise improve the agricultural land for uses that result in rendering such
land no longer suitable for agricultural use. Such development rights
may be severed from the fee simple right to constitute a restriction for
the preservation of the agricultural land.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-D:1 (Supp. 1983). New Jersey's comparable provision defines "development easement" as follows: " 'Development easement'
means an interest in land, less than fee simple absolute title thereto, which enables the owner to develop the land for any nonagricultural purpose as determined by the provisions of this act and any relevant rules or regulations
promulgated pursuant hereto ....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:1C-13(f) (West Supp.
1984).

66. See, e.g.,
CONN.

GEN. STAT. ANN.

§§ 22-26aa to -26ii (West Supp. 1985)

(acquisition of development rights); Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation
Foundation, MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 2-501 to -515 (Supp. 1984) (providing
for the purchase of land preservation easements); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
132A, § IIA (West Supp. 1985), ch. 184, § 31 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985) (Agricultural Preservation Restriction Program, providing for purchase of development rights); MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. §§ 554.701-.719 (Supp. 1984) (purchase
of development easements); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 67.870-.910 (Vernon Supp.

1984) (open space conservation); N.H.

REV. STAT.

ANN.

§§ 36-D:1 to D:14

(Supp. 1983) (acquisition of agricultural land development rights); Agricultural
Preserve Demonstration Program Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:IB-1 to -15 (West
Supp. 1984); id. §§ 4:1C-31 to -35; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5001-5013 (Purdon
Supp. 1984) (acquisition of interests in real property); Farmland Preservation
Act, R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 42-82-1 to -16 (Supp. 1983) (providing for the purchase
of development rights); W. VA. CODE § 8-24-72 to -78 (1984) (purchase of deed
restrictions).
Two recent laws authorize conservation easements for agricultural as well as
other purposes, but do not establish a special program. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw §§ 49-0301 to -0311 (McKinney 1984); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
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grams for purchase of development rights exist. 67 Although the
various state schemes are not identical, they are sufficiently similar to permit some generalization about their operation.
Usually, the state legislation creates a committee, board, or
other body charged with administration of the development
rights program. 68 The Maryland statute, for instance, establishes
an agricultural land preservation foundation, governed by a
board of trustees and empowered to administer the preservation
program. 6 9 This foundation, funded by the state and by private
grants, has authority to consider offers from qualified owners of
71
agricultural land 70 who want to sell their development rights.
§§ 183.001-.005 (Vernon Supp. 1984). See also Ky.

REV. STAT. §§ 65.410-.480
(1980), § 262.850(3) (Supp. 1984).
Also relevant is the Uniform Conservation Easement Act, 12 U.L.A. 51
(Supp. 1984). The Act is intended to maximize "the freedom of the creators of
the transaction to impose restrictions on the use of land and improvements in
order to protect them, and it allows a similar latitude to impose affirmative duties for the same purposes." Id., Commissioners' Prefatory Note. Under the
Act, restrictions and obligations connected with the land will bind successors,
even if the conservation easements are held in gross.
At least three states have adopted the Act. See, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 111.390-

440 (1984) (numerous variations from Uniform Act); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 1-19B-56 to -60 (Interim Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.40 (West Supp.
1984-85). The Texas Law uses some provisions of the Uniform Act. See TEX.
NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 183.001-.005 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
67. For a discussion of one such program in King County, Washington, see
Dunford, Savingfarmland-The King County program, 36J. SOIL & WATER CONSERV.
19 (1981). See also E. ROBERTS, THE LAW AND THE PRESERVATION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND 77-83 (1982) (analyzing a similar program in Suffolk County, New
York); Newton & Boast, supra note 62 (also analyzing the Suffolk County
program).
The West Virginia State Legislature has authorized counties to implement
their own land preservation programs by means of deed restriction purchases.
W. VA. CODE §§ 8-24-72 to -78 (1984). Thisglaw authorizes the purchase of suitable property which is then resold or leased, subject to an agricultural use restriction. Id. § 8-24-76. See also 1984 Conn. Legis. Serv. 153-155 (West) (Pub.
Act. No. 84-184, authorizing municipalities to establish an agricultural land
preservation fund to be used for acquisition of development rights).
68. Some states have depended on an existing state agency to administer
their programs. For example, the New Jersey agricultural preserve demonstration program is administered by the Department of Environmental Protection
and the Department of Agriculture. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:1B-6 (West Supp.
1984). The New Jersey Agriculture Retention and Development Act is administered by a State Agriculture Development Committee created by a nearly contemporaneous law. Id. § 4:1C-14.
69. MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 2-502 (Sqpp. 1983). Similarly, Rhode Island
has created an agricultural land preservation commission. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4282-3 (1984).
70. MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 2-509 to -510 (Supp. 1983). The Maryland
law is rather unique because only land located in an agricultural district is eligible for the easement purchase program. Id. § 2-509(d). See also N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 4:1C-24 (West Supp. 1984).
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The purchase price of any easement is specified by statute. The
maximum purchase price is equal to the asking price or the difference between the fair market value and the agricultural value of
the land, whichever is lower. 7 2 In the majority of cases, these statutes also provide that the state may accept gifts of conservation
73
easements.
The objective of the foundation's activity is to protect the
maximum acreage of prime farmland that needs protection. Accordingly, decisions for purchasing development rights are governed by priority ranking of the land for which development
rights have been offered.7 4 Some state statutes include criteria
for determining whether development rights may be acquired. In
Connecticut, for example, the major factor is the probability that
the land will be sold for nonagricultural purposes. 75 Other factors include the current and potential productivity of the land,
soil classification and other indicia of the land's agricultural suitability, the land's contribution to the agricultural potential of the
state, encumbrances, and the cost of acquiring development
rights. 76 At least one court has held that an interested landowner
has no absolute right to have development rights purchased by
77
the state.
After the development rights have been acquired pursuant to
statute, the land preservation foundation holds them and enforces the preservation restrictions. 78 The restricted land must
71. MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 2-505(b) (Supp. 1984) (funding); id. § 2-510.
The law also prescribes formation of county agricultural preservation advisory
boards, with review and advisory responsibilities. Id. § 2-504.1. Some conservation easement purchases require local contributions to the state fund. Id. §§ 2508, -510(g).
72. Id. § 2-511.
73. See, e.g., id. § 2-504(3); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26cc(a) (West Supp.
1985).
74. MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 2-510(d) (Supp. 1984). In determining
whether to approve an application to sell an easement, the county agricultural
board must take into consideration any priority for the preservation of agricultural land established by the foundation. Id.
75. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26cc(a) (West Supp. 1985).
76. Id. The Massachusetts Agricultural Preservation Restriction Program
has four criteria: "(1) quality of the soils for agricultural production; (2) degree
of threat facing the farm; (3) significance of the farm to the state's agriculture;
and (4) environmental and community planning objectives." Storrow & Winthrop, Agricultural land retention: The Massachusetts experience, 38 J. SOIL & WATER
CONSERv. 472, 473 (1983).
77. Appeal of MacEachran, 121 N.H. 1077, 1073, 438 A.2d 302, 304 (1981)
(the statute allowing the purchase of development rights was enacted for the
general welfare and not for the welfare of the owners of such rights).
78. MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 2-510 (Supp. 1983).
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be used for ordinary agricultural operations. 79 Commercial residential subdivisions are not permitted, but the owner may construct a personal dwelling under certain conditions. 80 The
purchase of an easement does not permit any right of access or
use to the public. 8 '
Normally, development rights or conservation easements ac82
quired under a state program are held by the state in perpetuity.
The resulting use restrictions run with the land and bind future
owners of the farmland. Usually, the development restrictions or
easements can be terminated, if at all, only by following statutory
procedures, and only when the public interest no longer requires
restriction of development on the property.8 3 At least one state,
however, has enacted legislation that authorizes the purchase of
84
deed restrictions for a finite, specified period of time.
Many of the development rights and conservation easement
statutes include a provision that addresses the issue of eminent
domain. But while most of these statutes mention the condemnation of both the farmer's restricted estate and the newly-acquired
rights of the state in that land, the actual provisions vary in their
85
treatment of land subject to the condemnation proceeding.
79. Id. § 2-513(a).

80. Id. § 2-513(b)(1).
81. Id. § 2-513(c).
82. For example, the Maryland statute provides:
It is the intent of the General Assembly that the easement
purchased under this subtitle be held by the foundation for as long as
profitable farming is feasible on the land under easement, and an easement may be terminated only in the manner and at the time specified in
this section.
Id. § 2-514(a). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26cc(b) (West Supp. 1985).

83. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
CODE ANN. § 2-514 (Supp. 1984).

22-26cc(c) (West Supp. 1985);

MD. AGRIC.

The release of a development restriction is usually accomplished only after
a public hearing. MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 2-514(b), (c) (Supp. 1984). If the
release is approved at the hearing, the landowner is allowed to repurchase the
development easement at a price reflecting the difference between the fair market value and the agricultural value of the land. Id. § 2-514(f).
84. See W. VA. CODE § 8-24-76 (1984). Purchase of a deed restriction can
be for "any period of time." If property is purchased by a county commission
and resold subject to a deed restriction, the restriction must limit the use of the
property to agricultural purposes for a period of not less than ten years. Id.
85. The Maryland statute, for example, lends no special protection to land
that is part of the program:
(a) This subtitle does not prohibit any agency of the State or of a
county from acquiring by condemnation land which is under an agricultural preservation easement held by the foundation if such acquisition
is for a public purpose.
(b) In the event of condemnation of land under an agricultural
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Whether land protected by development rights statutes, as well as
that embraced by agricultural districting programs, should be entitled to special treatment in condemnation hearings will be ad86
dressed in a later section of this article.
Although a number of states have authorized the purchase of
conservation easements or development rights to preserve agricultural land, states are not the only entities engaged in this type
of activity.8 7 Several private, nonprofit organizations, formed to
encourage agricultural land preservation, are acting independently to acquire development rights and conservation easements. Organizations like the Trust for Public Land and the
American Farmland Trust are engaged in acquiring these interests in farmland.8 8 Because these organizations are not public in
nature, the conservation easements or development restrictions
created under their auspices may be treated somewhat differently
89
from those created under state statutory programs.
Whether the landowner deals with a state or local agency or a
private trust, the farmer who conveys a conservation easement or
development rights retains title to the land and can continue to
farm the property. 90 The programs can be particularly attractive
preservation easement, the condemning authority, whether State or
county, shall pay:
(1) To the landowner the full amount to which the landowner would be entitled if the land was not under easement, less any
amount paid to the landowner by the foundation for the easement; and
(2) To the Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Fund,
an amount equal to any amount paid by the foundation for the
easement.
MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 2-515 (Supp. 1984).
86. See infra notes 300-10 and accompanying text.
87. The New Hampshire statute permits acquisition of development rights
on agricultural lands "by any governmental body or charitable corporation or
trust which has the authority to acquire interests in land." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-D:8 (Supp. 1983). See also N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw § 49-0305(3) (McKinney 1984) (conservation easement to be held only by a public body or nonprofit conservation organization).
88. The Trust for Public Land, according to one case study, has guided the
formation of 70 land trusts. This San Francisco-based conservation organization
has assisted ranching and farming communities in their efforts to retain land.
Barnes, An Alternative to Alternate Farm Valuation: The Conveyance of Conservation
Easements to an Agricultural Land Trust, 3 AGRIc. L.J. 308, 312 (1981). For a discussion of several other similar organizations, see Fenner, supra note 62, at
1043-46. For information on private activity in this area, see THE CALIFORNIA
STATE COASTAL CONSERVANCY, THE NONPROFIT PRIMER: A GUIDEBOOK FOR LAND
TRUSTS (1983). See generally American Farmland Trust, Farmland (newsletter).
89. For a discussion of this different treatment, see infra text accompanying
note 271,
90. As two authorities have stated, "Title to the land still rests with the
landowner, who enjoys all the traditional rights of property ownership, such as
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to farmers because, as landowners, they can realize part of the
value of the property without sacrificing their means of livelihood
and without being required to relocate. The farmer is free either
to sell the conservation easement, thereby realizing the cash value
of the land's development rights, or to donate it, thereby realizing
value in the form of an income tax deduction. 9 1
Another reason why programs for the sale of development
rights or conservation easements may be attractive to farmers is
that these programs, like agricultural districting programs, are
generally voluntary. Normally, the transfer of development rights
to the state takes place only if the farmer is willing to cooperate.
Indeed, at least one statute articulates the legislature's intention
to prohibit any use of eminent domain in acquiring development
easements on prime agricultural land. 92 Only two states permit
93
the acquisition of development rights by condemnation.
Once the farmer has conveyed the development rights or
conservation easement, the value of the farmer's land is reduced
by the value of its development potential. Thus, the farmer can
expect lower property taxes. 9 4 In addition, the reduced value of
the land may, in some situations, decrease the size of the farm
estate. The farmer will thus be faced with fewer obstacles in passthe right to privacy, to lease or sell the land, and to devise it to his or her heirs,
and of course, to farm the land." Storrow & Winthrop, supra note 76, at 472.
91. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h) 1982. See Qualified Conservation Contribution, 48 Fed.
Reg. 22940 (proposed May 23, 1983). See also, Private Letter Ruling No.
8422064 (Feb. 28, 1984) (accepting easement contribution as qualified conser-

vation easement). See generally R.

DUNFORD, AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL TAX POLIENCOURAGING DONATIONS OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS TO PRESERVE
NATURAL AREAS (Congressional Research Service, Rep. No. 84-48 ENR, Feb. 29,

CIES

1984).
Capital gains from the sale of development rights to a farmland preservation foundation may be subject to IRC § 55 alternative minimum tax. Gain from
the sale of development rights is not tax exempt. Warfield v. Commissioner, 84
T.C. 179 (1985).
92. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:1B-7 (West Supp. 1984) (Agricultural Preserve
Demonstration Program). The New Jersey statute provides:
The program shall be conducted on a voluntary basis for all landowners in the program area; the provisions of any law to the contrary
notwithstanding, it is the intention of this act to prohibit the exercise of
eminent domain by the State, or any agency or instrumentality thereof,
in acquiring development easements to prime agricultural lands pursuant to the provisions of this act.
Id.

93. See Mo.

ANN. STAT.

§ 67.885 (Vernon Supp. 1984);

PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

32, § 5005(a) (Purdon Supp. 1984).
94. This benefit may not help the farmer who already qualifies for a state
preferential taxation program designed for agricultural land. For a discussion of
preferential taxation programs, see supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
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ing the farmland intact to future generations. Moreover, proceeds from the sale of development rights may be available to
revitalize the farming operation. 9 5
These programs, with their voluntary nature and tangible
benefits, offer many advantages to landowners. And while productive agricultural land could be protected at substantially lower
cost through exclusive agricultural zoning, this method is usually
far less attractive to farmers because there is no compensation for
the resultant loss of the right to develop their property. In addition, although agricultural zoning is commonly used to preserve
agricultural land from developmental pressures, it is far from
clear that such zoning is immune from judicial challenge. 9 6 Nor is
zoning immune from political pressures in local communities;
these pressures may lead to amendments and variances in conventional zoning plans, 9 7 and sometimes result in windfalls to
landowners. Of course, in certain limited circumstances, a state
agency may relinquish development rights or conservation easements, but this transaction does not usually result in a windfall to
the individual landowner, as do zoning changes. Typically the development rights can be released only upon payment of their
value as of the time of sale. The proceeds are then available for
acquisition of development rights and conservation easements on
98
other land.
As the preceding paragraph suggests, the major drawback of
a program to acquire development rights or conservation easements is the high cost of acquisition. 9 9 The land with the greatest
need for protection, prime agricultural land in a high growth
area, also holds the most valuable development rights. The price
of acquiring development rights for a given parcel theoretically
equals the difference between the fair market value of the land
95. Bryant & Conklin, New FarmlandPreservationPrograms in New York, 41 J.
AM. INST. PLANNERS

390, 395 (1975).

96. See Zoning, supra note 23, at 4 (new theories, such as antitrust challenges,
for failure to rezone an agricultural district to permit development of a shopping
center may pose severe threats to attempts at farmland preservation).
97. See Nielsen, Preservationof Maryland Farmland. A Current Assessment, 8 U.
L. REV. 429, 454-55 (1979) (landowners' and developers' requests for variances can effectively erode a plan into nonexistence).
BALT.

98. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-82-5(e) (Supp. 1984). Even if an individual did
reap a windfall, the gain would not completely evade society's grasp. The windfall may be subject to a capital gains tax upon transfer or an estate tax upon
death. See Young, The Saskatchewan Land Bank, 40 SASK. L. REV. 1, 24 (1975).
99. See Batie & Looney, supra note 5, at 608.
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and its agricultural value.' 0 0 This means that in some instances,
where land with the potential for development enjoys inflated values, the development rights may cost almost as much as the fee
simple title itself.' 0 ' Because of the limited appropriations currently available, the scope of the programs is restricted severely.
The fiscal realities facing most states suggest that development
rights acquisition programs may be better suited to providing
open space preserves in urban areas than to protecting any significant acreage of farmland.' 0 2 State priorities can change over
time, however, and development restriction programs eventually
may play a more important role in the preservation of agricultural
land.
III.

EMINENT DOMAIN

As the foregoing has demonstrated, both agricultural district100. The Maryland law describing the value of an easement provides in
part:
The maximum value of any easement to be purchased shall be the
asking price or the difference between the fair market value of the land
and the agricultural value of the land, whichever is lower.
(1) The fair market value of the land is the price as of the valuation date for the highest and best use of the property which a vendor,
willing but not obligated to sell, would accept for the property, and
which a purchaser, willing but not obligated to buy, would pay for the
property if the property was not subject to any restriction imposed
under this subtitle.
(2) The agricultural value of land is the price as of the valuation
date which a vendor, willing but not obligated to sell, would accept for
the property, and which a purchaser, willing but not obligated to buy,
would pay for the property as a farm unit, to be used for agricultural
purposes.
MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 2-511 (Supp. 1984).

101. Batie & Looney, supra note 5, at 608.
102. The NewJersey demonstration program, for example, was intended to
create an agricultural preserve of only 5,000 acres. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 4:1B-5
(West Supp. 1984). In Connecticut, the state bond commission has power to
issue up to $14.75 million in bonds to finance purchases of preservation easements. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26hh (West Supp. 1976-1983). New Hampshire has appropriated $3 million for the acquisition of development rights.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-D:13 (Supp. 1983). These efforts protected 1068
acres in 15 farms. In 1985, an additional $2 million was authorized, with funds
to be raised through bond sales. New England Legislators Debate Farmland Protection, FARMLAND NOTES, Aug. 1985, at 1 (monthly newsletter of NASDA Research
Foundation Project). In Massachusetts, the recent acquisition of development
rights on the one hundredth farm to enter the program brings the total protected land to over 9,000 acres. Another 20 farms, constituting 1,735 acres, are
currently under contract to sell their preservation rights. Since the program's
enactment in 1977, $45 million has been committed to it. Wisconsin and Massachusetts Differ in FarmlandProtection Techniques But Not in Success, FARMLAND NOTES,
Aug. 1984, at 1, 2.
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ing laws and programs for the conveyance of development rights
or conservation easements have been enacted to implement an
important public purpose-to conserve farmland, either until the
time is ripe for orderly development or for the permanent benefit
of future generations. Yet that farmland may be desirable or even
required for activities other than farming. When one of these activities furthers a purpose for which a governmental entity has the
right to condemn land through its power of eminent domain, the
agricultural land becomes vulnerable. Thus, there is an important relationship between eminent domain and these farmland
preservation statutes. Before focusing on that relationship, however, this article will sketch some of the background of the eminent domain power.
A.

Origins

Eminent domain is "the power of the sovereign to take property for public use without the owner's consent upon making just
compensation." 0 3 Although this power has been exercised since
the days of the ancient Romans,10 4 it was not until the end of the
medieval period that takings for public use evolved as a separately-identified branch of governmental power.' 0 5 The origin of
the term eminent domain has been traced to Hugo Grotius, who
referred to "dominium eminens" in a 1625 treatise. 10 6 He described it as the power to take private property, not only in instances of extreme necessity, but also as a means to achieve public
utility.' 0 7 Grotius reasoned that the power grew out of the principle that the state had held original and absolute ownership of the
land before any individual had obtained possession. Thus, the
sovereign held an implied reservation in the land and could resume ownership when the land was required for the public
good.' 0 8 Although subject to extensive judicial criticism,' 0 9 Grotius' concept of ultimate ownership by the sovereign was eventu103. 1 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.1[1] (J. Sackman 3d
rev. ed. 1981) (emphasis omitted).
104. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553,
553-54 (1972).
105. 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 103, § 1.12.
106. Id. § 1.12[1] (citing H. GROTIUS, DEJURE BELLI ET PACIS, Lib. III, ch.
20 (1625)). See generally Lenhoff, Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42
COLUM. L. REV. 596 (1942).
107. 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 103, § 1.12[1].
108. Id. § 1.13.
109. I P. NICHOLS, supra note 103, § 1.13[3] & nn.39-43.
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ally adopted by several American states." 0
The majority of modern writers recognize eminent domain as
an attribute of state sovereignty, rather than as a reserved property right or as the state's exercise of ultimate ownership of the
soil."' The power "springs from . . . a necessity of government." 12 It is an inherent power of the sovereign, which does
not depend on recognition by constitutional provision, 1 3 and is
based on the superior right of the state over private property. In
this country, a state can enact any law affecting persons or property within its jurisdiction unless prohibited from doing so by the
federal Constitution or by that state's own Constitution." 4 Thus,
because the federal Constitution does not prohibit the taking of
private property for public use when the owner receives just compensation,' 1 5 eminent domain is within the states' authority.
Moreover, a state, through proper legislative enactment, can
delegate its authority to exercise eminent domain to counties,
municipalities, and other public bodies or corporations.'16
The federal government also enjoys the power of eminent
domain.' 17 For the first century of its existence, however, it did
not exercise that power. Instead, it relied on state governments
8
to condemn land and transfer it to the federal government."1
Then, in 1875, the Supreme Court decided that the federal government, although one of limited, delegated powers, could condemn land in its own name, in spite of the fact that the
Constitution does not grant that power expressly.' 9 The Court
110. Id. § 1.13. These states include Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Washington. Id.
111. Id. § 1.13[4].
112. Id. § 1.11.
113. Id. §§ 1.14[4], 3.1. For cases holding that the federal government's
eminent domain power is inherent, see United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry.
Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878).
114. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
115. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibiting the taking of private property
for public use without just compensation). The eminent domain clause of the
fifth amendment has been incorporated into due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and thus applies to the states. See Chicago B. & 0. R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 227 (1897).
116. See, e.g.,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-61-1 (Smith-Hurd 1962 & Supp.
1985).
117. See generally J. GELIN & D. MILLER, THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT DoMAIN §§ 1.1-.5 (1982).
118. Dau, Problems in Condemnation of Property Devoted to Public Use, 44 TEX. L.
REV. 1517, 1517-18 (1966).
119. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
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later found eminent domain to be an implied power, necessary
and proper for the execution of other powers expressly delegated
to the federal government.1 20 The Court characterized the power
as an "offspring of political necessity."' 21 More recently, the
Court remarked that the fifth amendment's prohibition of taking
private property for public use without just compensation 2 2 constituted a tacit recognition of the existence of the eminent domain
power. 123
B.

Elements of Eminent Domain

Reduced to its most essential terms, then, eminent domain is
the power to take private property without the owner's consent
for the public use. 124 Another element, compensation of the
property owner, while not essential to the meaning of eminent
25
domain, is nonetheless crucial to its valid exercise.'
Although the power to take private property would appear to
be relatively straightforward, the taking issue continues to raise
difficult analytical issues.' 2 6 When the sovereign or a properlydelegated subunit of government condemns property to build a
road, a school, or a courthouse, there is general agreement that a
taking has occurred and that compensation is due. Similarly, appropriation of even a minute portion of an individual's property
through actual, physical intrusion will almost invariably constitute
a taking.12 7 Where the governmental action is less clearly a physical appropriation of private property, however, conceptual
120. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 681 (1896).
121. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897) (quoting Searl v. Lake
County Sch. Dist., 133 U.S. 553, 562 (1890)).
122. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
123. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1946). The fifth
amendment itself does not grant this power to the federal government. Id.
124. 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 103, § 1.11.
125. Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also Long Island Water Supply Co.
v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 689 (1897) ("constitutional guarantee of just compensation is not a limitation on the power to take, but only a condition of its
exercise").
126. For discussions of the taking issue, see generally F. BOSSELMAN, D.
CALLIES &J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973); D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW,
ch. 2 (1982); Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the
Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465 (1983); Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1165 (1967); Oakes, "Property Rights" in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56
WASH. L. REV. 583 (1981); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE
L.J. 149 (1971).
127. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982) (cable television equipment installed on small section of plaintiff's roof
constituted a taking). See Costonis, supra note 126.
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problems are raised. Should governmental regulation that
merely restricts property use, or reduces the value of property, be
deemed a taking for constitutional purposes? For example, a zoning change from commercial to residential use can diminish property value significantly. Yet such action often will not be deemed
a taking even though the diminution in value is far greater than
that occasioned by many physical intrusions that are held to be
takings. 128
In the recent case of Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York

City,'1 29 the Supreme Court acknowledged that the question of

what constitutes a taking for purposes of the fifth amendment is
"a problem of considerable difficulty."' 30 The Court has articulated "no set formula to determine where regulation ends and
taking begins."' 13 Instead, it has adopted an ad hoc balancing
test. Factors that must be considered include the economic impact of a regulation, its interference with investment-backed expectations, the character of the governmental action,' 3 2 and
whether the interference is an actual physical invasion.' 3 3 Recent
Supreme Court decisions seem to indicate that a taking exists
only if the individual demonstrates either a permanent physical
invasion of property 34 or an interference that nearly destroys the
128. See, e.g., HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 125 Cal. Rptr.
365, 542 P.2d 237 (1975) (zoning change from commercial to residential, reducing value from $400,000 to $75,000, held not to constitute a taking), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 904 (1976). See also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413
(1922) ("Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the
general law.").
129. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
130. Id. at 123. In Penn Central, the City of New York had denied the owners of Grand Central Terminal permission to build a 50 story structure atop the
terminal on the basis of a local statute restricting the development of this and
other historical landmarks. Id. at 115. In holding that this restriction did not
constitute a taking, the Court found that "the restrictions imposed [were] substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare and not only permit[ted] reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site but also afforded
appellants opportunities to enhance further, not only the Terminal site proper,
but also other properties." Id. at 138.
131. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
132. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (Court
considered governmental action involving the exercise of the public right of navigation over interstate waters that provided highways for commerce.)
133. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (a "taking" is more likely when the governmental action constitutes a physical intrusion).
134. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982).
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value of the property by leaving no reasonable use. 13 5
Although the taking issue is significant and raises difficult
conceptual problems, this article focuses on the full exercise of
eminent domain rather than on regulatory action bearing the
characteristics of a taking. Moreover, the element of the eminent
domain power that focuses on the lack of the property owner's
consent is not particularly problematic, although the impending
involuntary loss of property may cause the landowner to challenge the eminent domain action.
Likewise, and notwithstanding many challenges to eminent
domain actions that have raised the issue, the question of just
compensation for the taking of property through eminent domain
is not predominant in the context of this article. As a general
rule, compensation is determined by the amount that the individual property owner has lost through the taking.13 6 This is usually
ascertained by reference to the value of the property when applied to its highest and best use in light of its present and potential uses.' 37 Fairness is another important consideration. 3 8 It
should be noted that agricultural land may present special compensation problems. When agricultural land is condemned and
part of a farmer's tract is taken, the condemning entity may leave
behind other parcels of land that are made less valuable or even
useless for farming. Highway construction, for example, often results in isolated triangular and circular fields that are inaccessible
or difficult to farm with large equipment. 139 In addition, some
projects for which land is condemned affect the drainage patterns
so crucial to productive agriculture. The determination of the
compensation that a farmer should justly receive is thus a rela135. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1980) (although
certain ordinances limit the development of particular land, they do not violate
the fifth and fourteenth amendments because the appellants are still free to pursue their reasonable investment expectations).
136. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195
(1910) (Ask "what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained."). See gener-

ally 3 P.

NICHOLS,

supra note 103, § 8.61.

137. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506 (1979) (property owners received fair market value, although below replacement cost).
138. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973) ("The constitutional
requirement ofjust compensation derives as much content from the basic equitable principles of fairness, ...
as it does from technical concepts of property
law." (citations omitted)).
139. See generally Schmidt, Freeway Impact on Agricultural Areas, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 587, 589 (1980) (dividing up farms in a variety of ways has adverse
impacts on the farms' ability to produce efficiently and economically). But see
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-710.03 (1981) (the condemnor of agricultural land must
select a route that follows section or half-section lines if at all possible).
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tively complex issue, and one.that will usually require analysis be140
yond mere appraisal of the land actually taken.
The proper exercise of eminent domain also requires that
property be taken for a "public use." 14 ' Although at one time in
its history this element of eminent domain meant that the general
public had to have the right to use the property taken, 142 the current understanding is much broader. In May 1984, the Supreme
Court rearticulated the liberal public use requirement in Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff.143 Midkiff involved a public use challenge to the Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967, which created a
land condemnation scheme designed to reduce concentration of
land ownership by taking title to real property from lessors and
transferring title to lessees. In holding that the statutory scheme
did not violate the public use test, 144 the Court relied in part on
Berman v. Parker.145 In Berman, the Court had upheld the state's
use of eminent domain to take blighted urban property, which it
then reconveyed to private developers.14 6 Invoking the reasoning
of Berman, the Midkiff Court concluded that eminent domain is a
product of the police power, and thus, "when the legislature has
spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh
conclusive."' 1 4 7 This suggests that once the object of the action is
within the legislature's authority, the right to use eminent domain
as a means to achieve that objective is clear. The Midkiff Court
140. See Comment, Condemnation of Agricultural Property in California, 11
U.C.D. L. REV. 555, 561-63 (1978) (discussing the complex implications of crop
valuation, severance damages, and compensation for crops cut down before
harvest).
141. For a general discussion of public use, see Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203 (1978); Sackman, Public UseUpdated (City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders), 1983 PROC. INST. ON PLAN., ZONING, & EMINENT DOMAIN 203 (Southwestern Legal Foundation); Comment, The
Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599
(1949); Note, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 409 (1983).
142. Some public use challenges emerged when railroads were delegated
power to condemn private property for expansion of the rail system. 2A P.
NICHOLS, supra note 103, § § 7.1-.1 [ 1]. Additional opposition arose when municipal governments began to include proprietary service activities. See, e.g., Rindge
Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923) (condemnation for public
highway). Efforts were made to restrict the use of eminent domain to situations
when the condemned property would be used by the public. See Ross, Transferring Land to Private Entities by the Power of Eminent Domain, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
355, 360 (1983).
143. 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
144. Id. at 2331-32.
145. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
146. Id. at 34-36.
147. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. at 2329 (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 32).
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viewed public use as "coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's
48
police powers." 1
As the Court noted in Midkif, the role of the courts in review49
ing the legislature's judgment on public use is narrow indeed.1
The judiciary should defer to the legislative determination unless
that determination clearly has no reasonable foundation. Thus,
courts should endorse legislative determinations of public use
whenever "the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose."' 150 Even an appropriation in which the property taken is transferred to private beneficiaries, as in Midkif, can have a public purpose. The Court
imposes no requirement that condemned property be used by the
general public. 15 The state may be able to advance its legitimate
public purpose without ever taking possession of the condemned
property. As the Court noted, "[I]t is only the taking's purpose,
and not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public
52
Use Clause."
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 32).
150. Id. at 2329-30.
151. Id. at 2331. See also Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700,
707 (1923); Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921).
152. 104 S. Ct. at 2331. The scope of review of the public use issue may be
more stringent in the state courts. Although subject to some variation, the majority rule appears to state that while the legislatures initially determine the issue, the ultimate decision is for the courts. 2A P. NICHOLS, supra note 103, § 7.4.
One state court defined a public use in these broad terms:
The public uses for which property may be condemned include the
following: (1) to enable government to carry on its functions, and to
preserve the safety, health and comfort of the public, whether or not its
individual members may use the property so taken, provided the taking
is by a public body; (2) to serve the public with some necessity or convenience of life required by the public as such and which cannot readily
be furnished without the aid of the government, whether or not the
taking is by a public body, provided the public may enjoy such service
as of right; and (3) in special and peculiar cases, sanctioned by custom
or justified by the existence of unusual local conditions, to enable individuals to cultivate their land or carry on business in a manner not
otherwise possible, if their success will indirectly enhance the public
welfare, even though the taking is by a private individual and the public
has no right to the enjoyment of the property taken or to service from
him.
County of Essex v. Hindenland, 35 N.J. Super. 479, 490, 114 A.2d 461, 467-68
(App. Div. 1955). See also Sackman, supra note 141.
Uses are "public" in Illinois, for example, when they meet four criteria(1) the use affects the community rather than an individual; (2) the law controls
the property's use; (3) title does not vest in a person or corporation as private
property to be used and controlled privately; and (4) the public receives the
benefit of public possession and use, with only the public body exercising con-
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C. Conflicting Public Uses
Before analyzing the provisions that concern eminent domain in agricultural districting and conservation easement laws, it
is useful to reflect briefly on the situation that arises when a single
piece of property is needed for more than one public use.1 53 Because the power of state government has become more diffuse as
a result of an increase in the number of state departments and
agencies, as well as municipalities and other governmental
units,' 54 the number of conflicting land needs has also increased.
The ordinary condemnation proceeding involves the state or
federal government, or a properly delegated subunit of government, and the individual property Owner. After it has been determined that the proposed action of the condemning authority is
intended to achieve a legitimate public use and is not arbitrary or
capricious, the only real issue remaining is the proper compensation for the taking. 155 The individual landowner cannot thwart
the public interest.
Occasionally, however, a public entity that enjoys the power
of eminent domain, either by virtue of its status or through delegation, finds it necessary or expedient to condemn property already committed to public use. The proposed condemnation may
impair or destroy that already existing public use. The general
rule used to resolve conflicts of this nature is that property already devoted to public use "cannot be taken and appropriated to
another and different use unless the legislative intent to so take it
has been manifested in express terms or by necessary implication."' 156 To ensure immunity from subsequent condemnation
trol. See Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Farina, 29 Ill. 2d 474, 194
N.E.2d 209 (1963).
153. For a more detailed analysis of conflicting public uses, see Dau, supra
note 118.
154. See Note, Government Immunity from Zoning, 22 B.C.L. REV. 783, 796
(1981).
155. See Blank v. Columbia Gas of Pa., Inc., I Pa. Commw. 304, 314 A.2d
880 (1974) (property may be condemned for the public good only if just compensation is made).
156. City of Moline v. Greene, 252 111. 475, 477, 96 N.E. 911, 912 (1911)
(city sought to widen street by taking 10 feet of property from public library);
City of Goldsboro v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 246 N.C. 101, 97 S.E.2d 486
(1957) (municipality could condemn land not essential to owner in operation of
2d 547,
public service); cf Illinois Cities Water Co. v. City of Mt. Vernon, 11 Ill.
144 N.E.2d 729 (1957) (municipality may acquire property of existing public
utility devoted to the same use as that contemplated by condemnor). See generally
1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 103, § 2.2 (discussing whether property already devoted to public use can be subjected to eminent domain); id. § 2.2[1] (nature of
proposed use is determining factor of when publicly-used land can be con-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985

31

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30: p. 701

for another public use, an entity acquiring the land through eminent domain must devote the property to public use and have a
legal obligation to maintain that use. 157 Several recent decisions
illustrate this basic principle, as well as related exceptions.
The Minnesota Supreme Court faced the issue of conflicting
public uses in City of Shakopee v. Clark.' 5 8 The city had petitioned
to condemn land for a street easement. The Metropolitan Waste
Control Commission (MWCC), a public body established to coordinate waste disposal in the metropolitan Minneapolis-St. Paul
area, challenged the petition. MWCC had acquired options on
the condemned land for a sludge disposal site, and had exercised
those options several months before Shakopee attempted to condemn the easement. Having encountered some difficulty in acquiring the necessary permits, MWCC had not yet actually begun
159
to use the property for a sludge site.
In deciding the case, the court first ascertained that MWCC
had a property interest in the land when the city filed its condemnation petition.' 60 The court next recited the general rule that a
condemnor with the right of eminent domain may not condemn
public property or property devoted to public use without authority expressly or impliedly granted by statute.' 6' In addition, the
court discussed several corollaries to the general rule. First, an
implied legislative intent to permit condemnation may be found if
the land has not actually been put to the prior public use. 16 2 The
owners, however, should be allowed to show that the property is
demned by necessary implication from statute); Annot., 12 A.L.R. 1502 (1921)
(explaining the right to condemn land originally purchased for public use but no
longer in actual use).
If, however, the United States is the condemning entity and is acting within
its constitutional powers, a supremacy issue may arise. The federal use may preempt other uses. See United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230 (1946) (in order to
build a post office and courthouse, federal government condemned land that
was held in trust and used for public purposes by the city); United States v.
Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 314 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963) (federal government condemned portion of municipal park for use in construction of highway).
See also Dau, supra note 118, at 1518-20 (discussing development of principle of
supremacy of a federal public use over all other uses).
157. Vermont Hydro-Elec. Corp. v. Dunn, 95 Vt. 144, 112 A. 223 (1921).
See generally Dau, supra note 118, at 1517.
158. 295 N.W.2d 495 (Minn. 1980).
159. Id. at 496-97.
160. Id. at 497-98. When MWCC exercised the options in a timely manner,
the contract became a purchase and sale agreement. As vendee, MWCC had an
interest in the property. Id. at 497.
161. Id. at 498. For a further discussion of this rule, see supra note 156 and
accompanying text.
162. 295 N.W.2d at 498. See also Michigan State Highway Comm'n v. St.
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needed for the prior public use, and that it will be applied to that
use without undue delay. 16 3 The Shakopee court found that
MWCC did need the property and was making a diligent effort to
set up its sludge disposal site. Second, an implied right to condemn may be inferred if the two public uses are not substantially
inconsistent, as in the case of an intersection of two public easements, such as a street and a railroad. 64 The Shakopee court
found, however, that the city's proposed street would have interfered with the sludge site.
Another circumstance in which an implied statutory right to
condemn publicly-used property may exist, according to the
court, is a situation in which the potential condemnor simply can16 5
not carry out its powers without appropriating the property.
Shakopee could not prove the absolute necessity of obtaining the
property, though it did suggest that building a street elsewhere
would be more expensive. The court concluded that, because
Shakopee had neither express nor implied statutory authority, the
city could not condemn the property for which MWCC had a
166
present need and a proposal for use.
In Shakopee, then, the court found no express statutory or implied legislative authority for the city to take property already
committed to public use. Other decisions, however, have found
such authority. In City of East Peoria v. Group Five Development
Co. ,167 for example, the court relied on statutory authority to permit condemnation. In an effort to engage in a road improvement
project, the city of East Peoria had attempted to condemn land
held by a community college district. The district objected to the
proposed taking. The case posed only one issue: whether the city
could condemn property already committed to public use. Looking to the legislative history behind the relevant statute that govJoseph Township, 48 Mich. App. 230, 210 N.W.2d 251 (1973) (allowing condemnation of previously dedicated property because land not used).
163. Shakopee, 295 N.W.2d at 498 (quoting Board of Water Commissioners
v. Roselawn Cemetery, 138 Minn. 458, 463, 165 N.W. 279, 281 (1917)).
164. Id. at 499. See also Tenneco, Inc. v. Central N.Y.R.R., 51 A.D.2d 676,
378 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1976) (allowing condemnation of lands already acquired for
public use because second public use would not interfere with or destroy the
first).
165. 295 N.W.2d at 500. See also 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 103, § 2.2[1]
(explaining the right to condemn publicly-used land by necessary implication
due to the nature of proposed use); Id. § 2.2[2] (explaining the degree of necessity that gives rise to the implication).
166. 295 N.W.2d at 500-01.
167. 87 Ill. 2d 42, 429 N.E.2d 492 (1981).
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erned the taking of property by cities,1 68 the Illinois Supreme
Court observed that the legislature had originally authorized the
condemnation only of private property for local improvements.
In response, however, to judicial decisions limiting eminent domain power to private property, the legislature had later amended
the statute to permit taking of private or public property. The
court concluded that the legislature had thus intended, through
this amendment, to permit condemnation of property already
committed to public use. As the court acknowledged, the legislature could confer a broad eminent domain power without naming
specific kinds of property to which the power applied. Any abuses
169
of that broad grant of power could be corrected in the courts.
Both Shakopee and East Peoria involved conflicting public uses,
where each entity claiming a necessity to use the land was a governmental or quasi-governmental body with an obligation to use
land under its control for a public purpose. Another decision,
Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 170 involved
a public utility and a private, nonprofit corporation. Wildlife Preserves had assembled in New Jersey a 1400-acre preserve named
Troy Meadows, one of the most important inland fresh-water wetlands in the northeast. Relatively free from man-made encroachments when assembled, the preserve was the subject of a
condemnation action by Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, which planned to build a gas pipeline and related facilities
on portions of the preserve. Wildlife Preserves alleged that the
right of way sought by Texas Eastern "would cause substantial
and irreparable damage by disturbing the natural habitat of ani171
mals and destroying the flora and fauna."
Wildlife Preserves challenged the condemnation, raising the
issue of prior public use and offering an alternate route for the
pipeline that would cause less damage to the preserve. The trial
court rejected the challenge, stating that the "mere voluntary assumption of public service which may be abandoned at any time
does not carry with it protection from the exercise of eminent do168. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 9-2-14 to -15 (Smith-Hurd 1962 & Supp.
1984) (act concerning local improvement).
169. 87 Ill. 2d at 47, 429 N.E.2d at 494.
170. 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966). See McCarter, The Case That Almost
Was, 54 A.B.A. J. 1076 (1968) (analyzing the Wildlife Preserves case and urging a
liberalization of the prior public use defense).
171. 89 N.J. Super. 1, 3, 213 A.2d 193, 194 (Law Div. 1965) (superior court
quoting Wildlife Preserve's answer in condemnation action), aff'd, 90 N.J. Super.
385, 217 A.2d 646 (App. Div.), rev'd, 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966).
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main."' 17 2 The intermediate appellate court affirmed.1 73 On appeal the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the dismissal of
the prior public use defense, noting that Wildlife Preserves was a
private organization and lacked the power to condemn lands.174
The court acknowledged, however, that Wildlife Preserves'
voluntary consecration of its lands as a wildlife preserve,
while not giving it the cloak of a public utility, does invest it with a special and unique status. Qualitatively, for
purposes of the present type of proceeding, the status
might be described as lower than that of a public utility
but higher than that of an ordinary owner who puts his
land to conventional use. Unquestionably, conservation
of natural resources can and would become a legitimate
public purpose if engaged in by the federal or state gov75
ernment or an authorized agency thereof.'
Also noting that a relevant federal law authorized the taking of
lands already committed to public use, 176 the court remanded the
case to give Wildlife Preserves the opportunity to present evidence on alternate routes for the pipeline.
Despite its "special and unique status," Wildlife Preserves
did not prevail in the lower court hearing on alternate routes.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in reviewing the decision on remand, upheld the trial court's conclusion that the right of way
sought by Texas Eastern "represented a reasonable exercise of
judgment."' 177 The Wildlife Preserves litigation indicates that a
merely voluntary action designed to devote property to public use
carries little weight when that property is needed for another
public use proposed by an entity with the power of eminent domain. The portion of the supreme court opinion quoted above
suggests, however, that conservation activity implemented by the
government itself would receive greater deference than that of a
private corporation.
172. Id. at 4-5, 213 A.2d at 195. The court continued: "It must appear that
the public has an enforceable right to a definite and fixed use of the property.
The test is not what the owner may choose to do but what under the law he must
do, and whether a public trust is impressed upon the land." Id. at 5, 213 A.2d at
195 (citations omitted). See 1 P. NICHOLS supra note 103, § 2.2.
173. 90 N.J. Super. 385, 217 A.2d 646 (App. Div. 1966).
174. 48 N.J. at 267-68, 225 A.2d at 134.
175. Id. at 268, 225 A.2d at 134.
176. Id. at 267, 225 A.2d at 133 (citing Federal Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 717f(h) (1982)).
177. 49 N.J. 403, 405, 230 A.2d 505, 506 (1967) (per curiam).
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EMINENT DOMAIN AND PROTECTED AGRICULTURAL LANDS

Eminent Domain Provisions in FarmlandProtection Laws

As the foregoing discussion has indicated, the power of emi-

nent domain is quite extensive and can be exercised by a large
number of governmental entities. Productive agricultural land,
which has geographic characteristics that make it suitable and
even attractive for many types of public improvements, often may
be the object of condemnation proceedings. The takings that result from such proceedings may destroy the agricultural viability
of the land or remove the land from production entirely. Legislatures have recognized the importance of protecting productive
agricultural land from development by enacting agricultural district statutes and conservation easement laws. It can be argued
that these lands should also be protected from development and
other changes implemented through condemnation. But as the
following analysis suggests, legislatures have been reluctant to

protect agricultural land from eminent domain incursions.
1. Agricultural District Laws
Legislatures that have enacted agricultural district laws have
approached the problem of eminent domain takings of protected
land in several different ways. The legislatures of Illinois and
Iowa, for example, have simply ignored the issue and have failed
to indicate what protection district land enjoys in the face of con-

demnation. 17 8 The Pennsylvania legislature, in instituting a program of covenants that operate like agricultural districts to
preserve farmland use for specific time periods, seems to have
made clear that this program will not affect eminent domain proceedings. The relevant statute provides that the landowner's covenant to preserve the land is not breached because of the
"acquisition by ...

eminent domain, and use of rights of way or

underground storage rights in such land by a public utility or
79
other body entitled to exercise the power of eminent domain."1
Other states have accorded some degree of protection to
178. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, §§ 1001-1020 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984);

IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 93A. 1-. 13 (West Supp. 1984). For a discussion of an Illinois
court's treatment of the Illinois statute, see infra notes 253-61 and accompanying text. See also MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 2-501 to -515 (Supp. 1983) (containing a provision addressing the eminent domain issue for conservation
easements, but not for agricultural districts).
179. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11946 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985). But see id.
tit. 71, § 106 (restricting in limited circumstances the condemnation of land being used for agricultural purposes).
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land in agricultural districts from powers of eminent domain.
The scope of this protection, however, varies. Kentucky legislation, for example, merely provides for a public hearing on the
taking. A recent amendment to the Kentucky agricultural district
law states that a member of a district who receives a condemnation proceeding summons concerning his land in the district may
request the local soil and water conservation district board of supervisors (the body that administers the act) to hold a public
hearing on the proposed taking.' 8 0 A hearing need not be held if
the condemnor is a utility with a certificate of convenience and
necessity for the project. 18 ' Moreover, the amended statute provides only for a hearing, and not for dismissal of the condemna82
tion suit. 1
Several states with agricultural district statutes have attempted to protect district land from unnecessary condemnation
by adopting a procedure that might be called the "second look"
approach. The laws that incorporate this approach generally apply the procedure both to acquisitions of land and to the advance83
ment of public funds for facilities to serve nonagricultural uses. 1
Although these state law provisions vary somewhat, they seem to
be based on a common model, perhaps the early New York statute, enacted in 1971.184
The Ohio provision is representative. Any public or private
agency that intends to appropriate more than "ten acres or ten
percent of an individual property under one ownership and currently used in agricultural production in an agricultural district"1 8 5 must notify the department of agriculture at least thirty
180. Ky. REV. STAT. § 262.850(16) (Supp. 1984). The amendment was part
of House Bill No. 35 (January 24, 1984).
181. Ky. REV. STAT. § 262.850(16) (Supp. 1984).
182. Id. Another recent Kentucky law designed to protect farmland may in
fact prevent condemnation of some land in agricultural districts. The law creates the Inter-Agency Farmland Advisory Committee, which must review all of
the projects proposed by state agencies that will require acquisition of more
than 50 acres of farmland. The Committee will review the proposal before the
state agency initiates action to take the farmland. After the Committee reviews
the proposal and holds a public hearing if one is requested, the Committee files
its report. It may recommend that the governor alter the proposed state project
if necessary "to balance the public interests." Ky.REV. STAT. § 262.875 (Supp.
1984).
183. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473H.15 (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. AGRIC. &
MKTS. LAw § 305(4) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 929.05 (Page Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 15.1-1512 (1981).
184. N.Y. AGRIC, & MKTS. LAw § 305(4) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
185. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 929.05(A) (Page Supp. 1983). The level of
interference with agricultural district land required for the statute to extend pro-
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days before beginning condemnation proceedings. 18 6 The notice
must justify the proposed action and evaluate alternatives that
would not involve land within the agricultural district. If, after
the department reviews the proposal, it decides that the proposed
action would adversely affect the district and that this adverse effect would outweigh the enhancement of public welfare from the
proposed project, the department must so inform the governor.
The governor must then issue an order suspending the project
for sixty days, during which time a public hearing is to be scheduled. After the hearing and before the end of the sixty-day period, the director of the department of agriculture must issue
findings and recommendations in writing. The public agency
with authority to approve or deny the proposed action must use
these findings and recommendations in reaching its final
87
decision.1
The protection that Ohio law gives to land in agricultural districts is not absolute. The statute does not actually prohibit takings even if this land will be affected adversely, but it does ensure
that the effects of the proposed project will be recognized by the
agency having ultimate authority over the project. Moreover, the
protection does not extend to all types of condemnation. The
provisions described above, for instance, do not apply to plans for
electric lines, gas and oil pipelines, or telephone lines, nor do the
provisions restrict any activity under the jurisdiction of the state
power siting board.18 8 In addition, the provisions do not apply if
the proposed action is an emergency project "immediately necessary for the preservation of the public health, safety, or general
89
welfare."1
tection varies somewhat. In New York and Virginia, the project gets a second
look if it involves more than ten acres from one farm or more than 100 acres in
the district. See N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAw § 305(4) (McKinney Supp. 1983); VA.
CODE § 15.1-1512(D) (1981). The Minnesota law invokes the review procedure
when a proposed acquisition or easement involves a gross area over ten acres in
size within agricultural preserves. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473H.15(1) (West
Supp. 1984).
186. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 929.05(B) (Page Supp. 1983). Notification is
not required, however, if (1) the condemnor has received federal agency approval of an environmental document that assesses the impact of the project on
the agricultural land, and (2) the state department of agriculture was involved in
coordination of the document. Id.
187. Id. The statute also gives the director of agriculture the authority to
institute a civil action to enjoin appropriation within an agricultural district until
findings and recommendations are made. The injunction may be granted even
though no irreparable injury is threatened. Id. § 929.05(C).
188. See id. § 929.05(D).
189. Id. § 929.05(E). Finally, the section does not apply to intrafamily sales
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A comparable statute in New York extends similar protection, although its application varies somewhat from that of Ohio's
provision.' 90 Virginia's law is also similar, but it has a more severe impact on the condemning entity. 19' In Virginia, after the
local governing body reviews the proposed action, it reports its
decision to the entity proposing the action through issuance of a
final order. If the proposing entity is aggrieved by the order, it
may appeal to the court of the circuit in which a majority of the
land is located.' 9 2 By shifting the burden of an appeal to the condemning entity, the Virginia statute may help to discourage the
taking of land in agricultural districts.
The Minnesota legislation, which authorizes agricultural preserves in several counties in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area,' 9 3 provides for a "second look" similar to those
described above, but also includes an additional means of delaying condemnation actions that will adversely affect land in preserves. The environmental quality board, the reviewing agency
under the Minnesota legislation, has authority to suspend any eminent domain action for up to one year when the action is contrary
to the purposes of the metropolitan preserve law and when
"there are feasible and prudent alternatives which have less negative impact on the agricultural preserves."' 9 4 The Minnesota law
also prohibits construction of sanitary sewer systems and public
water systems that benefit land or buildings in agricultural preserves.' 9 5 The purpose of this provision is to protect the relatively scarce lands in the metropolitan area for long-term
96
agricultural use.1
or transfers of land for the purpose of the construction of a dwelling in which
the receiving family member will live. Id. § 929.05(F). See generally Comment,
Farmland Preservationin Ohio--Good News for Land Speculators?, 12 CAP. U.L. REV.
229, 239-48 (1982) (critically evaluating Ohio's agricultural districting statute).
190. See N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAw § 305(4) (McKinney Supp. 1983). The
New York law includes no exemption for utility lines and related facilities. Id.
191. VA. CODE § 15.1-1512(D) (1981).
192. Id.
193. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 473H.01-.18 (West Supp. 1984).
194. Id. § 473H.15(9).
195. Id. § 473H.11.
196. Id. § 473H.01. In California, the Land Conservation Act (also called
the Williamson Act) adopts a second-look approach. The law allows cities and
counties to declare areas as agricultural preserves. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51230
(West 1983). The city or county may then contract with landowners to restrict
agricultural land to agricultural uses. Id. § 51240. Strictly speaking, this arrangement does not create "agricultural districts" as the term is used in this
article, but the effect is similar.
The California statute furthers a policy of avoiding, wherever possible, the
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Perhaps the most comprehensive protection of land in agricultural districts is found in the New Jersey Agriculture Retention
and Development Act of 1983,197 which implements a two-tiered
scheme of protection. Under the New Jersey law, local agricultural development boards can establish "agricultural development areas" in which agriculture is the preferred, albeit not
necessarily the exclusive, use of the land.' 98 Once an agricultural
development area has been established, any entity that intends to
acquire land in the area through eminent domain must file a notice of intent that justifies the acquisition and evaluates alternatives.' 9 9 This notice is followed by a review similar to the review
20 0
procedure enacted in Ohio.
Certain New Jersey landowners within an agricultural development area may petition for the creation of a "municipally approved program," which is established after review in a way
similar to the creation of agricultural districts. 20 ' Landowners
within a municipally approved program must agree to keep their
20 2
land in agricultural production for a minimum of eight years.
The land then qualifies for the higher tier of protection from eminent domain:
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, no public body shall exercise the power of eminent
domain for the acquisition of land in a municipally approved program . . . unless the Governor declares that
location of various public improvements in agricultural preserves. When such
avoidance is impossible, the policy is to locate the necessary improvements on
land that is not under contract. Id. § 51290. Land under contract cannot be
taken without special justification. Id. See generally id. § § 51290-51295. Despite
articulation of this policy, however, the provisions may not be effective in preserving agricultural land. See Comment, supra note 140, at 559-60 (explaining
factors that diminish effectiveness of the Williamson Act). See also 58 Op. Cal.
Att'y Gen. 729, 749 (1975) (State Energy Commission decision to build a nuclear power plant overrides any determination by local authorities that plant
construction should be prohibited on land restricted to open space use under
the Williamson Act).
197. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:1C-I1 to -37 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
198. Id. § 4:1C-18.
199. Id. § 4:1C-19.
200. For a discussion of Ohio's review procedure, see supra notes 185-89
and accompanying text.
201. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:1C-21 to -22 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
202. Id. § 4:1C-24. Landowners who petition for creation of a "farmland
preservation program" also contract to retain land in agricultural production for
at least eight years. Id. § 4:1C-20. It seems, however, that land in this program
does not qualify for the more stringent protection provided under "municipally
approved" programs. See id. § 4:1C-25.
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the action is necessary for the public health, safety and
welfare and that there is no immediately apparent feasi20 3
ble alternative.
If the governor does find that the eminent domain action is necessary and that no alternative exists, the proposed condemnation is
still subject to the lower-tier review. 20 4 The New Jersey law does
not completely eliminate condemnation of land in a municipally
203. Id. § 4:1C-25. This protection also applies in cases of proposed funding to construct facilities to serve nonfarm structures. Id.
204. Id. See also id. § 4:1C-19 (public body intending to exercise eminent
domain must file notice with the board).
A recent opinion by the Wisconsin Attorney General holds promise for the
interpretation of farmland preservation laws. See Opinion Letter from Wisconsin Attorney General Bronson C. LaFollette to James E. Murphy (Feb. 26, 1985)
(copy on file at Villanova Law Review office). The opinion analyzed the interaction between the Wisconsin Farmland Preservation Law, Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 91.13 (West Supp. 1985) and its eminent domain law, id. § 32 (West 1973).
Specifically, the opinion addressed the issue of whether a county highway committee could condemn land which was subject to a farmland preservation agreement executed under § 91.13.
In this instance, Michael and Gail Kubiak had placed their 122-acre farm in
the state farmland preservation program for 25 years, under an agreement that
restricted their right to develop the land. Subsequently, the Marinette County
Highway Commission proposed to condemn seven acres of the Kubiaks' farmland to expand an existing roadway. Opinion Letter, supra, at 1.
The Attorney General stated that "the state's Farmland Preservation Law
does not permit unilateral violation by county highway committees to construct
highways through farmland, in spite of local eminent domain power." Id. The
Attorney General noted that structures could be built on land subject to a farmland agreement only in two instances. Either the changes had to be consistent
with the land's agricultural use or both the local governing body and the State
Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection (DATCP) had to
approve the changes. Id. at 2-3. Neither of these two instances was present.
First, as the Attorney General noted, building a road on farmland "cannot reasonably be said to be 'consistent with agricutural use.' " Id. at 2 (citing Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 91.13(8)(a) (West Supp. 1985)). Second, neither the county nor
the DATCP had approved the highway plan. Id. at 3.
The opinion went on to note that the DATCP has approved special uses for
farmland under agreements only when the proposed uses do not conflict with
the land's agricultural use and it is necessary to use the land because there are no
alternative locations available. Id. Even if the county could have approved the
road construction, it could not satisfy the two DATCP criteria. Based on an
agricultural impact statement which stated that the Kubiaks' land was of "statewide importance," the Attorney General concluded that the proposed condemnation conflicted with the land's agricultural use. Id. Additionally, there were
two alternative proposals which could have accomplished the highway commission's goal of expanding the existing roadway. Id. Thus, it was not essential to
condemn the Kubiaks' land.
The Attorney General supported his conclusion by stating that under a general rule of statutory construction a later law prevails over an older law if the two
conflict. Id. at 4. Accordingly, he concluded that the Wisconsin Farmland Preservation Law should prevail over its older eminent domain law. Otherwise, he
noted, if the county commission could unilaterally remove land under a preservation agreement, the purpose of the Farmland Preservation Law would be frus-
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approved program; nonetheless, it imposes significant procedural
obstacles designed to discourage all but the most crucial condemnations of protected agricultural land.
2.

Conservation Easements and Related Programs

Like agricultural district laws, statutes that authorize conservation easements or purchase of development rights approach the
issue of eminent domain in a variety of ways. Some statutes that
establish conservation easement programs fail to address the condemnation issue at all. 20 5 Other laws have provisions that seem

to indicate that eminent domain actions against protected land
may proceed, though subject to certain slight restrictions. For
example, Michigan requires that any development rights easement must provide in its terms that no nonfarm structures can be
built on the land without the approval of the local governing
body. 20 6 This provision seems to recognize the continued vulnertrated and those sections which give the DATCP final authority to determine
special uses would be negated. Id.
In addition, the Attorney General cited analogous federal cases that protect
important natural resources from condemnation for highway construction. See
id. at 4-5 (citing United States v. 162.20 Acres of Land, More or Less, 639 F.2d
299 (5th Cir. 1981) (requiring compliance with the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1982); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (rejecting use of parkland for highway projects, pursuant to the Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1982); Thompson v.
Fugate, 347 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Va. 1972)).
205. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-26aa to -26ii (West Supp. 1985);
W. VA. CODE §§ 8-24-72 to -78 (1984); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 183.001.005 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (authorizing conservation easements, but establishing
no state or local program to purchase such easements).
While the Massachusetts program does not restrict eminent domain takings,
it does protect agricultural land from takings to a limited degree. See MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 79 § 5B (West 1969 & Supp. 1984-1985); id. ch. 132A, § 11A
(West Supp. 1984); id. ch. 184, § 31 (West 1977 & Supp. 1984-1985). For a
discussion of Massachusetts' law, see infra text accompanying notes 244-50.
Missouri's statute is silent on the issue of whether land in easements can be
taken by eminent domain for general public purposes. See Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 67.870-.910 (Vernon Supp. 1984). It does, however, permit the exercise of
eminent domain power to acquire private property for the conservation program itself, subject to certain conditions. Id. § 67.885. Nonprofit organizations
cannot acquire property for conservation through eminent domain. Id.
§ 67.890.
The Uniform Conservation Easement Act also fails to address the eminent
domain issue. "[T]he Act neither limits nor enlarges the power of eminent domain; such matters as the scope of that power and the entitlement of property
owners to compensation upon its exercise are determined not by this Act but by
the adopting state's eminent domain code and related statutes." 12 U.L.A. 51,
53 comissioners' pref. note (Supp. 1984).
206. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 554.707(5)(a) (West Supp. 1984-1985).
The provision does not apply to lines for utility transmission or distribution. Id.
§ 554.707(5)(c). It must be noted, however, that few states protect agricultural
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ability of the land at least to some condemnations. Pennsylvania
legislation goes even further, providing that state or county ownership of an "open space property interest" does not preclude
acquisition-by eminent domain or otherwise-and use of rights
of way in the property by a public utility or other body with eminent domain power. Such acquisition, however, is subject to re20 7
quirements for notice, hearing, and approval.
Maryland's provision is quite explicit in its treatment of the
exercise of eminent domain. Its agricultural preservation law
does not prohibit "any agency of the state or of a county" from
condemning land under an agricultural preservation easement
held by the state-established foundation, "if such an acquisition is
for a public purpose." 20 8 The law also determines who will receive the just compensation in case of condemnation of land
under an agricultural preservation easement. The landowner will
receive the full amount that would have been due but for the
easement, less any amounts paid to that landowner by the state
foundation. The condemnor must pay to the state land preservation fund the amount that the foundation paid for the
209
easement.
Several states with development easement programs do grant
substantial protection to land encumbered by easements. In New
Jersey, development easements may be purchased under certain
conditions from landowners whose land is part of a municipally
approved program and who have contracted to keep their land in
production for at least eight years. 21 0 The New Jersey law prolands against utility development. Another Michigan provision directs all agencies of state government to cooperate in the exchange of information concerning projects and activities that might jeopardize land preservation under the Act.
See id. § 554.716.
New York's scenic easement law, which authorizes private easements to preserve farmland, also seems to permit condemnation:
No general law of the state which operates to defeat the enforcement of any interest in real property shall operate to defeat the enforcement of any conservation easement unless such general law expressly
states the intent to defeat the enforcement of such easement or provides for the exercise of the powers of eminent domain.
N.Y. ENVrL. CONSERV. LAw § 49-0305(5) (McKinney 1984).
207. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5011 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985). The Pennsylvania statute permits exercise of eminent domain to acquire interests in realty
for purposes of the conservation law. Id. § 5008.

208.

MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN.

§ 2-515(a) (Supp. 1984). The public purpose

requirement, of course, is necessary for any lawful exercise of eminent domain.
For a discussion of the public purpose requirement, see supra notes 141-52 and
accompanying text.
209. Id. § 2-515(b).
210. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:1C-24(b) (West Supp. 1984-1985).
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vides that "[n]o development easement purchased pursuant to
the provisions of this act shall be sold, given, transferred or otherwise conveyed in any manner." 2 11 It is possible that this restric-

tion may be invoked to prevent condemnation of land in
easements, though it is not at all clear that the restriction was intended for this use. Even if the restriction does not prevent condemnation, however, land in development easements will receive
the two-tiered protection described in connection with agricultural districts in New Jersey.2 t2 Only land that is already under
contract qualifies for the purchase of a development easement.
That land receives the higher tier of protection, which should not
be lost merely because a development easement is transferred as
authorized by statute.
Both New Hampshire and Rhode Island also restrict eminent
domain actions against land in the state's development rights programs. New Hampshire's protection, however, is relatively weak.
That state's law provides that powers to acquire land for public
use by eminent domain are not diminished, "provided, however,
alternative land areas are considered.- 21 3 Public utilities may use
eminent domain to obtain easements if the utilities thoroughly
consider alternative areas, guarantee minimum practicable interference with agricultural operations, obtain necessary authorizations from government agencies, and compensate the landowner
as if the land were not an agricultural preservation site. 21 4 A taking in violation of these restrictions can result in a court action
filed on behalf of the landowner. 21 5 This provision suggests that
the New Hampshire legislature intended a level ofjudicial review
more stringent than the usual deferential "look" to determine if
the condemnor's action was arbitrary or capricious.
Rhode Island gives protection similar to that afforded by the
higher tier in New Jersey's system. The Rhode Island law provides that "[a]ny state or local agency must demonstrate extreme
need and the lack of any viable alternative before exercising a
right of eminent domain over any farmland to which the development rights have been purchased . . . on behalf of the state

.... 26 An agency attempting to condemn such land must file a
211. Id. §4:1C-32(a).
212. For a discussion of New Jersey's two-tiered protection plan, see supra
notes 197-204 and accompanying text.
213. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-D:12(I) (Supp. 1983).
214. Id. § 36-D:12(II).
215. Id. § 36-D:12(III).
216. R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-82-6 (Supp. 1984).
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report showing the necessity of the condemnation. The report
must be endorsed by the governor after public hearings. Moreover, if the land preservation commission believes that necessity
for the taking has not been demonstrated, it may sue for a decision on the issue. 2 17 The Rhode Island statute does not define
"extreme need" or "viable alternative." Nonetheless, the law
demonstrates the intention to discourage all but the most critical
incursions into protected agricultural land.
As with agricultural district statutes, no conservation easement law entirely prohibits the exercise of eminent domain
against protected farmland. It is interesting to note, however,
that the states with the more stringent protection-New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Rhode Island-are located in the heavilypopulated Northeast, where farmland may be most urgently in
need of protection.
3.

Some Policy Background

As the above survey of statutes indicates, agricultural land in
special programs receives relatively little protection from condemnation. No statute gives absolute exemption from eminent
domain. 21 8 Some do require a second look or restrict takings to
cases of extreme need, but others either ignore the issue entirely
or imply that condemnation is not affected by the farmland protections laws.
Both the agricultural district and conservation easement programs have the general goal of protecting productive agricultural
land. Moreover, a number of statutes intend that state departments and agencies cooperate in exchanging information-sometimes including information on eminent domain 2 19 -on projects
and programs that might jeopardize successful implementation of
the law. 220 Yet the simple directive that state agencies should mitigate the adverse effects of their programs on the continued use
of agricultural land in agricultural districts 22 ' can hardly be said
to abrogate, or even restrict, the power of eminent domain.
One might expect that land in conservation easements and
217. Id.
218. For a discussion of the inalienability of eminent domain, see infra
notes 272-81 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 91.03 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
220. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 262.850(12) (Supp. 1984); Mich. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 554.716 (West Supp. 1984-1985). For the text of Kentucky's provision, see supra note 51.

221. See Ky.

REV. STAT.

§ 262.850(12) (Supp. 1984).
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related programs would receive greater protection from eminent
domain than land in agricultural districts. As earlier discussion
has indicated, agricultural districts are intended to delay, not to
prevent entirely, the conversion and development of farmland.
Conservation easements, on the other hand, are usually donated
or sold in perpetuity and are designed for the long-term preservation of agricultural land for agricultural uses. Thus, while condemnation of land in agricultural districts would simply hasten
eventual conversion, condemnation of land protected by a conservation easement would contravene the very purpose of that
easement: the permanent preservation of the land.
Another difference between agricultural districts and conservation easements is also relevant. Although land in agricultural
districts is normally restricted to agricultural uses, fee interest in
that land is still held by the farmer. The agricultural district
agreement, though often filed in real estate records for the purpose of public notice, does not generally involve a transfer of title
in the property. In contrast, when land is subject to a conservation easement or similar development restriction, the landowner
has actually conveyed part of his interest in the property. Another entity now enjoys an interest in the land, that is, the right to
develop. That entity may be the state or a subunit, depending on
the structure of the state's conservation easement program. In
other instances, the conservation easement may have been conveyed to a private, nonprofit corporation. When the easement is
held by a government entity, the issue of public use may be raised
in any subsequent condemnation proceedings. 2 2 When a private
organization holds the easement, there is less chance that public
223
use will be an issue.
Although at the outset both agricultural districts and conservation easements are normally voluntary in nature, 224 their natures change after the district is formed or the easement
conveyed. Generally, the district remains in effect for a specified
period of time, subject to renewal. Nonetheless, many programs
222. For a discussion of the public use requirement, see supra notes 141-42
and accompanying text.
223. Cf Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48
N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966) (unsuccessful attempt by private organization
owning land preserve to use prior public use as a defense to condemnation proceedings). For a discussion of Wildlife Preserves, see supra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
224. Some state statutes, however, provide for the acquisition of development rights by condemnation. For examples of two such statutes, see supra note
93.
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leave some flexibility to the landowners, so that an element of
choice remains. For example, some district laws permit either an
225
owner or his heir to withdraw rather easily from the district.
Other programs permit heirs of the member landowner to withdraw. 2 26 In some programs, when land in a district is sold to a

new owner, that owner may withdraw from the district within a
certain period of time. 22 7 In other programs, land can be re-

leased from a district in instances of severe hardship or for other
cause. 228 In contrast, when a conservation easement is conveyed
under a statutory program, the public body that accepted the
easement is usually charged with enforcement of the easement. 2 29
Moreover, this statutory duty is usually ongoing because the easements are either permanent2 30 or releasable only in limited circumstances. 23 ' Thus, the public entity has the duty to protect the
land from development in the interest of the public welfare.
Given the foregoing analysis of the practical and policy-based
differences between agricultural districts and conservation easements, it could be asserted that land held in a conservation easement is devoted to a public use and deserves some degree of
protection from eminent domain actions. No decision has so
held. In fact, the rather sketchy protection accorded conservation
easements in the relevant statutes tends to weigh against this
conclusion.
4.

Eminent Domain and Unprotected Farmland

At this juncture, it may be useful to look briefly at a few statutes that discourage eminent domain takings of all types of productive farmland, rather than solely farmland in special
agricultural district or conservation easement programs. This
brief survey is not intended to be comprehensive. Furthermore,
the statutes considered here are from states that also have special
225. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 262.850(11) (Supp. 1984) (allowing withdrawal upon written notification to the local district board).
226. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 15.1-1513(D) (1981) (allowing heirs and devisees
of landowners in agricultural district to withdraw as a matter of right).
227. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 929.02(C) (Page Supp. 1983). The
withdrawal, however, may be subject to penalty. Id.
228. See, e.g., MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 2-509(7)(i) (Supp. 1984).
229. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:1C-33 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
230. See, e.g., id. § 4:lC-32.
231. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-D:7 to D:8 (Supp. 1983) (allowing
release if site is no longer suitable for farming or if municipality requests release
for the public good).
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farmland protection programs. It is interesting to note that these
statutes are generally narrow in scope.
Pennsylvania law creates an agricultural lands condemnation
approval board. Before productive agricultural land is condemned for certain purposes, the board must have the opportunity to determine that there is no reasonable and prudent
alternative to the use of the productive agricultural lands. 2 32 This
board's jurisdiction, however, is quite limited. It encompasses
2
condemnation only for highway and waste disposal purposes. "3
Similarly, certain condemnations of agricultural land in Minnesota are subject to review under a law that implements a state
policy to preserve agricultural land and conserve its long-term
use for agricultural production.2 3 4 Any agency action, including a
taking for nonagricultural use, 2 3 5 that adversely affects ten acres
or more of agricultural land must be reviewed. 23 6 The agency
must attempt to find alternative methods or locations, or attempt
to reduce the adverse effects of the proposed action. In so doing,
the agency must perform a cost-benefit analysis. 2 37 Although this
law seems to extend broad protection, its scope also is limited
because it applies only to state agencies, 23 8 and not to the numer2 39
ous other governmental entities with eminent domain power.
Wisconsin has a law that requires potential condemnors 240 to
provide notice of projects in which the exercise of eminent domain may affect a farm operation. 24 1 If more than five acres of a
232. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71 § 106(b) (Purdon Supp. 1984).
233. Id. § 106(d)(1), (2). For an explanation of a similar program in California that attempted to avoid public improvements in agricultural preserves,
see supra note 196.
234. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 17.80 (West Supp. 1984).
235. Id. § 17.81(2).
236. Id. § 17.82 (planned agency action must be referred to the commissioner who reviews the action and makes recommendations based on policies set
forth instatute).
237. Id.
238. Id. § 17.81(5). See id. § 15.01 (West 1977 & Supp. 1984) (defining
"state agencies"). Other states also have laws that direct state agencies to ensure that their programs do not convert agricultural land unnecessarily. See, e.g.,
ILL. ANN. STrAT. ch. 5 §§ 1301-1308 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985).
239. One such type of governmental entity-the municipality-is charged
with protecting agricultural land in its planningactivities. See MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 462.351 (West Supp. 1984).
240. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 32.02 (West 1973) (defining who may exercise eminent domain powers).
241. Id. § 32.035(3) (West Supp. 1984-1985). Condemnors of easements
who desire to construct some types of electric transmission lines, however, are
not required to provide such notice. Id. § 32.035(2).
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farm operation will be affected, the law requires preparation of an
agricultural impact statement. This statement must include a description of land that will lose agricultural production, as well as
analyses and recommendations concerning the proposed project. 24 2 Although the impact statement receives rather wide distribution, 24 3 an adverse recommendation will not in itself halt a
project with harmful effects on farmland.
Massachusetts also protects property used for agriculture or
farming. 24 4 In its earliest version, the relevant statute stated that
no such property could be taken without consent of the owner,
except after a hearing at which the owner could introduce evidence that other nonagricultural land was available for the proposed public use. 24 5 In a case involving the taking of agricultural
land for the building of a school, a landowner invoked the provisions of the statute. 24 6 The owner suggested seven alternative
sites for the school, but after these sites were inspected, all were
rejected in favor of the owner's farmland. 24 7 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, upholding the rejection of the alternative sites, held that the statute did not require the selection of a
nonagricultural site. 24 8 The statute was subsequently amended to
encompass easements taken without consent and to provide that
if evidence of alternative sites is introduced and accepted as valid,
agricultural property is exempted from the taking. 24 9 The statute, however, does not apply to takings on behalf of the Commonwealth for highways or for public utilities.2 50 Thus, its impact
242. Id. § 32.035(4). The Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer
Protection is to prepare the impact statement. The condemnor pays the cost.
Id. § 32.035(3), (4).
243. Id. § 32.035(5). The impact statement is distributed to the governor's
office, legislative committees on agriculture and transportation, local units of
government in affected jurisdictions, local news media, public libraries, individuals and groups either requesting or demonstrating an interest in the information, and the condemnor. Id.
244. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, § 5B (West 1969 & Supp. 1984) (providing a hearing at which owner can show that alternative land is available).
245. Act ofJune 15, 1950, ch. 532, 1950 Mass. Acts 372 (current version at
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, § 5B (West 1969 & Supp. 1984-1985)).
246. DelPrete v. Board of Selectmen, 351 Mass. 344, 220 N.E.2d 912
(1966).
247. Id. at 345-46, 220 N.E.2d at 913.
248. Id. at 346, 220 N.E.2d at 913-14. The court explained that the effect
of the statute was to ensure owners of agricultural land subject to condemnation
a full opportunity to be heard. Id.
249. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 79, § 5B (West 1969 & Supp. 1984-1985).
See also id. ch. 34, § 25; id. ch. 40, § 8C (protecting agricultural land from condemnation for conservation purposes).
250. Id. ch. 79, § 5B.
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is quite narrow.

This sampling of state laws protecting farmland from eminent domain indicates that, as with agricultural districting and
conservation easements, protection is limited. The laws tend to
impose restrictions only on selected entities with eminent domain
power. In addition, they tend to exempt from restriction certain
kinds of eminent domain takings, such as those for utility easements 25 1 and highways. Ironically, however, it is these exempted

takings that may cause the greatest damage to farming operations. In fact, the most that these laws accomplish is to require a
"second look" at a limited classification of takings of agricultural
land.
B.

Condemning ProtectedAgricultural Land. The Likely
Judicial Outcome

Agricultural district laws and conservation easement programs are relatively recent legislative developments. As a result,
few decisions interpreting their provisions have been reported.
Similarly, courts have had little opportunity to rule on challenges
to eminent domain actions against protected farmland, despite
the significance of this issue. Nonetheless, it is useful to review
one recent decision on the condemnation issue and to project the
likely results should other cases arise.
1. Agricultural Districts
Agricultural district statutes offer at best only limited protection against condemnation actions. 2 52 A recent Illinois circuit
court decision, Gass v. Kramer,25 3 suggests that agricultural districts may be ineffectual in protecting farmland from condemnation for nonagricultural uses.
In late 1981, Gordon and MaryJane Gass, corn and soybean
farmers in Madison County in southwestern Illinois, petitioned to
designate 899 of their more than 2200 acres as an agricultural
area, in accordance with the Illinois agricultural areas statute.
Having followed the proper statutory procedure, the Madison
County Board granted the designation in January, 1982. At about
251. But see NEB.

REV. STAT.

§ 76-710.03 (1981) (requiring condemnor to

select route that follows section or half-section lines if possible).
252. For a general discussion of agricultural district laws, see supra notes
178-204 and accompanying text.
253. No. 83-CH-263 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 15, 1983) (order denying preliminary injunction), affd, Department of Transportation v. Keller, 127 Ill. App. 3d
976, 469 N.E.2d 262 (1984).
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the same time, the Illinois Department of Transportation revitalized its plans to construct an extension of Interstate 255 in
Madison County. As planned, the extension would divide the
Gass farm in half. Moreover, a five and one-half mile segment of
the extension would require the acquisition of thirty-two acres of
254
the Gass land that formed part of the agricultural area.
The Gass family challenged the acquisition of their land by
petitioning for injunctive relief in Madison County Circuit Court.
They alleged that the Department of Transportation's threatened
condemnation action would contravene the Illinois agricultural
district law. 2 55 They also alleged that if the Department initiated
the condemnation suit, they would suffer irreparable damage. Arguing that Illinois eminent domain law did not provide for the
withdrawal of lands from "agricultural areas," and that those
lands were to be protected and enhanced for the public purpose
of preventing the irreplacable loss of agricultural land, 2 56 the
Gass family petitioned the court for preliminary and permanent
257
injunctions against the threatened condemnation.
The court denied the petition. Acknowledging that the Gass
land was part of a properly formed agricultural area, the court
noted that the Illinois agricultural areas law did not address the
question of eminent domain. The state, said the court, has the
inherent power to condemn, limited only by the state constitution
and specific statutes. The state eminent domain act grants to the
Department of Transportation the right to exercise that power on
behalf of the state. There could be no limit on the exercise of that
power except as set forth specifically in the statutes. 2 58 Although
the Gass family had asserted that the legislative history of the agricultural areas law demonstrated the legislative intention to restrict eminent domain proceedings against land in agricultural
areas, 2 59 the court refused to infer this intention from the statute
254. Petitioner's Petition for Injunctive Relief at 1-2, Gass v. Kramer, No.
83-CH-263 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed Oct. 24, 1983).
255. Id. at 2-3 (citing ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, §§ 1001-1020 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1984-1985)).
256. Id. at 3 (citing ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, § 1002 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 19841985)). The petitioners inferred that if the Department of Transportation succeeded in condemning the land, the agricultural value of that land could never
be replaced. This would result in a violation of the state's public policy, a violation for which there was no adequate remedy at law. Id. In addition, the land
was already devoted to a public use and therefore was entitled to a certain
amount of protection.
257. Id.
258. Gass, No. 83-CH-263, order at 2.
259. Id. at 2-3. The legislative history of the agricultural areas law indicates
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as enacted. The court reasoned that the statute restricted some
local government actions affecting the protected land, but did not
expressly prohibit actions by the state or its agencies. Stating that
general policy statements directed toward protection of land in
agricultural areas did not suffice to prohibit the exercise of eminent domain, the court held that "the language contained in this
statute is not express and explicit enough to so limit the Department of Transportation's right to exercise eminent domain over
the properties in these areas." '2 60 Thus, the court denied the peti26 1
tion for injunctive relief.

Gass v. Kramer involved an agricultural district statute that
failed to address the eminent domain issue. Unfortunately, there
is little reason to anticipate that different results will flow from
other statutes. As the Gass decision indicates, eminent domain is
deemed an inherent power of the state that can be exercised in
the absence of contrary legislative pronouncements. 2 62 Moreover,
the argument that agricultural district land is already devoted to
public use, and therefore protected from certain condemnation
proceedings, is likely to fail. 26 3 Title to the land is still held by the
landowner rather than by a public entity, and most agricultural
district programs allow the landowner to retain some element of
choice, albeit limited, as to continued participation in the
program.
Thus, it is clear that land in agricultural districts can be condemned in those states whose statutes permit condemnation of
land in districts. Even states requiring a second look at certain
that the governor deleted from the Act language that restricted the condemnation of land in agricultural areas. Evidently, utility companies had objected to
the language. House Debate on H.R. 1184, 81st Gen. Ass. 14 (Oct. 17, 1979).
260. Gass, No. 83-CH-263, order at 4-5. The appellate court agreed that
"the Act does not create a barrier to eminent domain simply by virtue of the fact
that the property sought is utilized for agricultural purposes." 127 Ill. App. 3d
at 979, 469 N.E.2d at 265. One Illinois House member had characterized the
law, perhaps aptly where eminent domain is concerned, as a "congratulatory
Resolution of the Legislature that really has no... legal impact." House Debate
on H.B. 1184, 81st Gen. Ass. 14, 17 (Oct. 17, 1979) (statement of Rep.
Brummer).
261. Gass, No. 83-CH-263, order at 5. In so doing, the court ruled solely on
whether the petitioner's property was exempt from the attempted exercise of
eminent domain. It did not limit the Gass family's right to challenge the condemnation on grounds of necessity and public use in the eminent domain proceeding. See id.
262. For a discussion on the origins of eminent domain, see supra notes
103-23 and accompanying text.
263. For a discussion of the problem of conflicting prior public uses, see
supra notes 153-69 and accompanying text.
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proposed condemnations generally provide little real protection
because review recommendations need not be followed. Lacking
that requirement, and assuming review procedures have been followed, it is improbable that a court would hold that the agricultural district law actually prohibits the eminent domain
proceeding. Only in a state like New Jersey, with clearly articulated limitations on eminent domain actions, can courts be expected to prevent condemnation of protected land. And even the
264
New Jersey law does not confer absolute protection.
2.

Conservation Easements and Related Programs

Although conservation easements are normally conveyed
with the intention of preserving farmland permanently for agricultural uses, it is unlikely that land protected by such easements
will fare much better than agricultural districts in a condemnation
proceeding. Some statutes make clear that eminent domain is not
affected. In the few states with statutory directives that restrict
the exercise of eminent domain, alternative land areas must be
considered, or the condemnor must demonstrate "extreme
need." 26 5 Yet these protections are not absolute, and condemnors may be able to meet their statutory burden.
When the conservation easement is silent on the question of
eminent domain, or when protection against condemnation is
minimal and the condemning agency decides to proceed with the
action, successful judicial challenges may be rare. Challengers
could argue that when a public entity, such as a farmland preservation agency, is holding the conservation easement, the land is
already devoted to a public use. Indeed, several courts have acknowledged that a scenic easement is a public use, although public access to the land is visual, rather than physical. 266 But no state
has recognized the prior existing public use defense 2 67 as a com264. For a discussion of New Jersey's provisions, see supra notes 197-204
and accompanying text.
265. For a discussion of state conservation easement programs that restrict
the use of eminent domain, see supra notes 206-17 and accompanying text.
266. See, e.g., Kamrowski v. Wisconsin, 31 Wis. 2d 256, 265, 142 N.W.2d
793, 797 (1966). See also Finks v. Maine State Highway Comm'n, 328 A.2d 791
(Me. 1974) (scenic easement is public use; excessive taking is abuse of power);
Hardesty v. State Roads Comm'n, 276 Md. 25, 343 A.2d 884 (1975) (attempt to
abandon proceeding after scenic easement was taken); Richley v. Crow, 43 Ohio
Misc. 94, 334 N.E.2d 542 (Ct. Com. Pleas 1975) (scenic easement is public purpose and use, but may be taken constitutionally through eminent domain).
267. For a discussion of this defense, see supra notes 156-69 and accompanying text.
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plete bar to the condemnation of land subject to a conservation
2 68
easement designed to protect agricultural uses.
Even if the conservation easement were to be recognized as a
public use, that characterization may be of little help in preventing condemnation. The state itself generally enjoys the right to
take property already committed to public use for a different public use. 269 Moreover, the prior public use defense is subject to a
number of exceptions that serve to weaken its protection. 2 70 Finally, where the conservation easement is held by a private organization such as the nonprofit corporation in Wildlife Preserves, the
27
prior public use defense may be deemed wholly irrelevant. '
Thus, those state projects that are often most damaging to agricultural land, such as highway construction, may face little hindrance from conservation easement programs.
C. Desirable Statutory Directives: Taking a Second Look
Several states have carefully designed programs intended to
protect valuable agricultural land for short-term and permanent
268. Cf Wade v. Kramer, 121 Ill. App. 3d 377, 459 N.E. 2d 1025 (1984). In
Wade, plaintiffs sought an injunction to prohibit construction of a highway
bridge across the Illinois River. The bridge and connecting highway would be
built through part of the Pike County Conservation Area. Plaintiffs alleged that
the public trust doctrine prevented removal of property from the conservation
area. Not disputing its status as trustee for the public, the state argued that it
had authority to alter the use of public trust property if the public interest required the alteration. The court agreed. Id. at 381, 459 N.E. 2d at 1028. The
court noted that the state can "reallocate property from one public purpose to
another without violating the public trust doctrine." Id. To hold otherwise
would prevent the government from accommodating new public needs. Id. In
this case, the legislature and Department of Transportation had decided that
benefits to citizens from construction of the new highway outweighed the damage to the conservation area.
269. See Dau, supra note 118, at 1520-26 (discussing the condemnation of
property already devoted to public use); Annot., 35 A.L.R. 3d 1293, 1304 (1967)
(examining power of state to condemn property of governmental subdivision or
property held by another state agency).
270. For a discussion of these exceptions, see supra notes 158-69 and accompanying text. In states like Missouri and Pennsylvania, where conservation
easements themselves can be condemned, the prior public use defense may be
more successful. The holder of the conservation easement then enjoys a mutual
power of eminent domain, as does the condemnor for the competing public use.
271. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48 NJ.
261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966) (rejecting prior use defense to condemnation by public utility despite characterization of special status conferred on private corporation that owned the land). For a discussion of Wildlife Preserves, see supra notes
170-77 and accompanying text. Cf Vermont Hydro-Elec. Corp. v. Dunn, 95 Vt.
144, 112 A. 223 (1921) (public service corporation successfully prevented city
from condemning water rights because city had no express or implied legislative
authority to condemn prior publicly-used land).
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agricultural production. Yet some of these states have addressed
the issue of eminent domain actions against protected land only
obliquely, if at all. In most instances, protected agricultural land
remains vulnerable to condemnation by numerous public entities
for a wide variety of public uses. The valid exercise of eminent
domain against this protected farmland can render ineffectual the
protections conferred by agricultural districting and conservation
easement statutes. Moreover, a law that does not address the
question of condemnation will usually allow the condemnation of
protected farmland. Weak provisions will have the same result.
Thus, it is essential that consideration of eminent domain be an
integral part of the development or modification of statutory programs designed to protect agricultural land.
1. Alternative Approaches
a.

Inalienability of Eminent Domain

At first glance, it would seem that the easiest way to protect
agricultural districts and conservation easements from condemnation is for the state simply to declare lands in these programs
immune from the eminent domain power. Immunity could be
granted either by a statutory provision denying the power or by a
contractual agreement. This approach must be rejected, however, because of the universal principle that a state is forbidden to
alienate its power of eminent domain.2 72 The power of eminent
domain is "an essential attribute of sovereignty [that] cannot be
even partially bargained away. Without it, a state cannot be a
state." 2 73 Indeed, this principle may explain in part the evident
reluctance of state legislatures to restrict in any significant way
the exercise of eminent domain against protected agricultural
land.

274

West River Bridge Co. v. Dix 275 is a leading case on the inaliena272. 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 103, § 1.141[3]. See West River Bridge Co. v.
Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848). For a discussion of West River Bridge, see infra
text accompanying notes 275-78. See also Southern Indiana Gas & Elec. Co. v.
City of Boonville, 215 Ind. 552, 20 N.E.2d 648 (1939) (eminent domain power
cannot be surrendered; if attempted to be contracted away, it can be resumed at
will); Trustees of Phillips Exeter Academy v. Exeter, 90 N.H. 472, 11 A.2d 569
(1940) (eminent domain power is similar to the police and taxation powers of
government in that it cannot be alienated or impaired); Bowling v. State Bd. of
County Comm'rs, 428 P.2d 331 (Okla. 1967) (eminent domain power is inalienable and cannot be contracted away).
273. 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 103, § 1.141[3].
274. See Ag Districts and the Taking Issue, FARMLAND NOTES, Mar. 1984, at 1, 3
(monthly newsletter of NASDA Research Foundation Project).
275. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848).
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bility of a state's eminent domain power. In West River Bridge, the
state of Virginia had granted to a company a franchise to erect a
bridge and collect tolls. When the state later decided to exercise
its eminent domain power to open the bridge to free public use,
the bridge company asserted that the state was violating its contract in a way that contravened the impairment of contracts clause
2 76
of the Federal Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the state's right to
exercise eminent domain. The Court found the power of eminent
domain to be an essential means of "guarding [the state's] own
existence, and of protecting and promoting the interest and welfare of the community at large . . . . This power [is] . . . para' 2 77
mount to all private rights vested under the government."
Reasoning that every contract is made in subordination to the
higher, pre-existing authority of the laws of the community to
which the parties belong, the Court stated that all contracts must
yield to the laws' control as an unwritten yet paramount condition
to the contract. Thus, the right of eminent domain did not impair
the contract, but only required that certain conditions be fulfilled
2 78
before the contract could be carried out.
Similarly, a state cannot entirely divest itself of the power of
eminent domain through statutory enactment. 2 79 Village of Hyde
Park v. Oak Woods Cemetery Association2 80 involved a situation in
which the state, through a special act, had promised that lands
taken by a cemetery association would not be condemned for the
use of roads. When the Village of Hyde Park later wanted to condemn part of the cemetery for roadways, the court, reflecting the
reasoning of West River Bridge, held that any legislative bargain in
restraint of eminent domain is unwarranted and void. The court
said that the state "had no power to divest itself of the right of
eminent domain, by any act it might pass which would prevent the
exercise of that right in the future, when, in the opinion of the
legislature, a case arose wherein the public interest demanded the
276. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 10.
277. 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 531.
278. Id. at 532. See also Bowling v. State Bd. of County Comm'rs, 428 P.2d
331 (Okla. 1967) (resjudicata and collateral estoppel do not constitute defenses
to condemnation actions initiated subsequent to agreement settling previous
condemnation actions between same parties); State Parks & Recreation Comm.
v. Schlunegar, 3 Wash. App. 536, 475 P.2d 916 (1970) (agent of state cannot
bind state to restricted exercises of eminent domain).
2-79. 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 103, § 1.141[3].
280. 119 Ill. 141, 7 N.E. 627 (1886). See also Hollister v. State, 9 Idaho 8, 71

P. 541 (1903).
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exercise of the power."2 81
Hyde Park suggests that a statutory declaration that completely prohibits the exercise of eminent domain against land in
agricultural district or conservation easement programs would
not be upheld. Even if such wholesale protection were upheld,
however, it might not be desirable, because it would codify a legislative decision that agriculture is always the preferred use of the
protected land. Even the most avid proponents of farmland protection would no doubt acknowledge that other public purposes
may sometimes compete legitimately for priority. For example,
although highway construction and public utility development are
damaging to productive farmland, they may be essential to serve
the needs of a large segment of a state's, or even the nation's,
population. The acquisition of protected land for nonagricultural
uses may be easier to justify under an agricultural district program than under a conservation easement program, with its goal
of permanent protection. Yet even in the latter situation, goals
and priorities can change over time; some element of flexibility is
therefore desirable. 28 2 Complete prohibition of eminent domain,
even if otherwise acceptable, would eliminate this flexibility.
b.

Prior Public Use

Establishing the viability of the prior public use defense
might be another way to prevent condemnation of protected agricultural lands. 283 The statute itself could declare protected agricultural land uses to be public uses. But at least as they are
presently constituted, agricultural districts are unreceptive vehicles for establishing this defense.2 8 4 The nature of conservation
easements held by private entities would present similar difficul281. 119 Ill. at 149, 7 N.E. at 630. Nonetheless, the court in Hyde Park did
not allow the village to condemn the cemetery property for use as a roadway.
The dispute involved two entities endowed with the similar right to take lands;
thus the court reasoned that the legislature should make the ultimate decision
regarding the preferred public use. Because the legislature had already stated
specifically that the cemetery lands should be free of roads and had never reversed that decision, the court held that the cemetery association had a superior
right to the land. Id. at 150, 7 N.E. at 631.
282. This desire for flexibility may explain in part the provisions in some
conservation easement statutes that permit the release of easements under specified circumstances. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-D:7 to -D:8 (Supp.
1983) (allowing release if site is no longer suitable for farming or if municipality
requests release for the public good).
283. For a discussion of the prior public use defense, see supra notes 156-69
and accompanying text.
284. For a discussion of the problem of conflicting prior uses, see supra
notes 153-69 and accompanying text.
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ties. State or public ownership of conservation easements and
development rights would make the assertion of public use more
acceptable for those programs. But the prior public use defense
would not prevent all condemnations. It is subject to numerous
exceptions that are likely to permit damaging takings of protected
28 5
farmland, perhaps without careful consideration.
Even if accepted and effectively employed, however, the prior
public use defense would not resolve the conflict between competing land uses any better than does the traditional approach,
which reasons that the condemnor's decision is conclusive in the
absence of clear abuse of discretion. 2 86 The prior public use defense simply favors the landowners over the condemnor in a condemnation action. But the public use first established by the
landowner may not be the more compelling of the competing
uses. 2 87 Indeed, the landowner's defense may ignore the equities
of the conflict. 28 8 Like the traditional approach, the prior public
use defense carries with it the potential for encouraging decisionmaking that avoids careful evaluation of the merits of competing
land uses.
c.

Zoning and Eminent Domain

In one sense, the relationship between agricultural districting
and conservation easement laws and the eminent domain power
is similar to the traditional relationship between zoning enactments and eminent domain. In both instances, an entity perceived to enjoy superior power (that is, the eminent domain
power) attempts to exercise the power in the face of a conflicting,
though legislatively authorized, land use scheme. It is instructive
to look briefly at the typical resolution of conflicts between zoning
28 9
and eminent domain.
In a number of jurisdictions, it has been held that the power
285. For a discussion of these exceptions, see supra notes 158-69 & 269-70
and accompanying text.
286. See, e.g., Blank v. Columbia Gas of Pa., Inc., 11 Pa. Commw. 304, 314
A.2d 880 (1974) (burden is on party challenging condemnation to show fraud,
bad faith, unreasonableness, or arbitrariness of condemnor; without these,
courts should not interfere with the choice of condemnor).
287. Cf Note, supra note 154, at 795-96.
288. Id. at 796, 813. See also Comment, BalancingInterests to Determine Governmental Exemption from Zoning Laws, 1973 U. ILL. L. F. 125, 140 (criticizing a decision in which the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to exempt Rutgers
University from zoning laws that prohibited the building of college apartments).
289. See generally Sackman, The Impact of Zoning and Eminent Domain upon Each
Other, 1971 PROC. OF THE INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 107 (Southwestern Legal Foundation); Note, supra note 154; Note, Governmental Immunity
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of eminent domain is inherently superior to the zoning power.
Thus, a governmental entity with the power of eminent domain is
generally held to be immune from zoning regulations. 290 This
traditional rule is articulated in City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan
Sanitary District,29i which involved the location of a water reclamation plant, as authorized by the Metropolitan Sanitary District of
Greater Chicago. The placement of the plant violated the Des
Plaines zoning ordinance. The only issue before the Illinois
Supreme Court was whether the zoning ordinance had any effect
on the sanitary district's power of eminent domain.
The court held that the sanitary district could condemn land
to build its water reclamation plant, although the plant's location
would violate the city's zoning ordinance. In so holding, the
court noted that "[t]he possibility that eminent domain would
conflict with local zoning regulations does not demonstrate legislative intent to withhold the eminent domain power." 2 92 Recognizing that the sanitary district enjoyed statutory power to
condemn, the court stated that "[t]o find that the condemnation
power of the district is subject to the restrictions of local municipal zoning ordinances would be to relegate the authority of the
district to that of a private land owner, and would thereby frus29 3
trate the purpose of the statute."
A dissenting judge objected to what he perceived as an unjustified grant of superior authority to one of the two municipal
corporations involved, when both had received power through
legislative enactments and therefore should be considered equal
in status. In his opinion, the effect of the decision was to give the
from Local Zoning Ordinances, 84 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1971) (examining the traditional judicial responses to govermental exemptions from zoning laws).
290. Sackman, supra note 289, at 119. Sometimes the immunity applies to
governmental functions but not to proprietary ones. See Town of Oronoco v.
City of Rochester, 293 Minn. 468, 197 N.W.2d 426 (1972).
291. 48 Ill. 2d 11, 268 N.E.2d 428 (1971).
292. Id. at 13-14, 268 N.E.2d at 430 (quoting Village of Schiller Park v. City
of Chicago, 26 Ill. 2d 278, 186 N.E.2d 343, 345 (1962)).
293. Id. at 14, 268 N.E.2d at 430. See also City of Scottsdale v. Municipal
Court, 90 Ariz. 393, 368 P.2d 637 (1962) (municipality exercising governmental
function is not subject to zoning of another municipality in which condemned
land is located); Howard v. City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940);
State ex rel. Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Mo. 1960) ("Local zoning
ordinances are not applicable to public uses of property for which an agency of
the government has the power to exercise eminent domain."); Kedroff v. Town
of Springfield, 127 Vt. 624, 256 A.2d 457 (1969) (municipality not subject to
zoning in performing governmental functions); South Hill Sewer Dist. v. Pierce
County, 22 Wash. App. 738, 591 P.2d 877 (1979) (city's power of eminent domain superior to county's zoning regulations).
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sanitary district "plenary authority to exercise its powers of 9emi2 4
of
nent domain in total disregard of the zoning ordinances
the city. The dissenting judge found no evidence of effective protection against abuse of this plenary power.
Some jurisdictions have rejected this traditional approach in
favor of an approach that uses a "balancing of public interests"
test to resolve conflicts between the power of eminent domain
and zoning ordinances that prohibit the proposed use. 2 95 These
jurisdictions have recognized that " 'superior authority' in the
political hierarchy does not necessarily imply superior ability in
allocating land uses." 29 6
The Supreme Court of Ohio faced such a conflict in Brownfield v. State.2 9 7 The state had purchased a single-family residence
to use as a halfway house for rehabilitating psychiatric patients.
This use violated the local zoning ordinance. The state argued
that the power to zone is subordinate to the power to condemn
and that because the state had the power to condemn property
for the halfway house, the house should be immune from zoning
regulations. On appeal, the central issue was whether the privately operated, state-owned facility was automatically exempt
from municipal zoning restrictions.
The Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that both the municipal zoning power and the state eminent domain power were intended to effectuate public purposes. The court found that the
correct approach in cases involving governmental entities with
conflicting interests is "to weigh the general public purposes to
be served by the exercise of each power, and to resolve the impasse in favor of that power which will serve the needs of the
greater number of our citizens." 298 Conceding that zoning ordinances may frustrate the exercise of eminent domain, the court
nevertheless refused to invoke absolute immunity from the ordi294. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 4 Ill. 2d at 15, 268 N.E.2d at 431
(Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).
295. See, e.g., Town of Oronoco v. City of Rochester, 293 Minn. 468, 471,
197 N.W.2d 426, 429-30 (1972). Accord Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282,
407 N.E.2d 1365 (1980); City of Fargo v. Harwood Township, 256 N.W.2d 694
(N.D. 1977) (balancing of public interests test appropriate to resolve conflicts
between competing governmental agencies). For a discussion of Brownfield, see
infra text accompanying notes 297-99.
296. Note, supra note 289, at 878.
297. 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 407 N.E.2d 1365 (1980). See Comment, Government Immunity from Local Zoning Restrictions: The Balancing Test of Brownfield v. State,
43 OHIO ST. L.J. 229 (1982).
298. 63 Ohio St. 2d at 285, 407 N.E.2d at 1367.
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nances. As the court reasoned, in many instances, projects involving eminent domain can be completed in harmony with
zoning ordinances. Absent a clear statutory grant of immunity,
the condemning entity must attempt to comply with the zoning
restrictions. A court required to balance the interests of the condemning entity and the municipality to decide whether the condemnor should be immune from zoning regulations should
consider "the essential nature of the government-owned facility,
the impact of the facility upon the surrounding property, and the
299
alternative locations available for the facility."
2.

The Balance of Interests: Imposing the Second Look by Statute

The reasoning one court used in resolving a conflict between
eminent domain and zoning restrictions could, with slight modification, apply also to conflicts between eminent domain and protected agricultural land uses:
Granting absolute immunity to political subdivisions
with the right to condemn.., can undermine the essential purpose of [farmland preservation programs]; that is,
to rationally coordinate land-use planning to promote
orderly development .... Taken to its logical conclusion, this kind of automatic exemption could lead to absurd results .... This sort of unilateral decision on the
part of the condemning authority is the antithesis of
300
sound land use planning.
As the foregoing discussion has indicated, it is not desirable
simply to permit all entities with eminent domain power to condemn land that is part of an agricultural district or conservation
easement program. The enactment of a farmland preservation
program is a statement of legislative purpose and public policy.
Indeed, most of the relevant statutes state explicitly that public
299. Id. at 286-87, 407 N.E.2d at 1368. In discussing the "superior sovereign" approach as a means of determining immunity from zoning regulation,
one commentator has stated:
If a political unit of superior authority has made no attempt to examine alternative locations for the proposed institutional facility, if
there is no independent supervisory review of the agency's determination, or if the social utility of the particular facility is subject to question, this presumption of immunity [from the local zoning ordinance]
could certainly be rebutted ....
Note, supra note 289 at 878.
300. City of Fargo v. Harwood Township, 256 N.W.2d 694, 697 (N.D.
1977).
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policy requires the preservation of farmland. 3 0 Moreover, these
statutes enact programs that have been designed to carry out the
public policy. To permit the exercise of eminent domain in the
face of agricultural land protection programs, without requiring
at least a balancing of alternatives, is to weaken the implementation of the public policy of farmland preservation. To permit eminent domain in all circumstances is to recognize tacitly that every
other public purpose is superior to the continued preservation of
farmland.
On the other hand, it is equally undesirable to restrict condemnation unduly. The needs of society often change, and the
eminent domain power is designed to allow governmental entities
to accommodate those changing needs. Agriculture may not always be the preferred use of the land that is part of a farmland
preservation program. It is doubtful, however, that the condemning entity itself is optimally suited to determine the preferred use
of the agricultural land. It would be overly optimistic to assume
that a condemning entity will always balance the public interest
and thus condemn property only when its proposed use is more
advantageous to society than the current use. It would be equally
optimistic to assume that the condemning entity is even capable
of recognizing the competing interests and the many factors that
influence decisions concerning land allocation. Finally, to assume
that the condemnor will always reach an impartial decision, in
spite of its own interest in the outcome, is to deny the realities of
the situation. 30 2 Clearly, unbiased outside review is needed.
One must recognize, however, that abandoning the traditional approach to eminent domain-that the decision of the condemnor is conclusive in the absence of abuse of discretion-will
involve some costs. The traditional rule is rather mechanical and
therefore easy to apply.3 0 3 It works well in the majority of eminent domain cases, involving ordinary condemnations against private individuals. These proceedings do not require the timeconsuming process of weighing the competing interests. The imposition of a "second look" at condemnations of protected agricultural land will therefore cause increased costs and delay,
though only in evaluating the takings subject to the second look.
301. For a discussion of the goals of agricultural land preservation, see
supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
302. See Note, supra note 154, at 795-96.
303. See id. at 813; Comment, supra note 288, at 136 (explaining courts'
reluctance to abandon traditional tests for upholding zoning laws in favor of a
multifactor analysis).
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Yet the delay may serve to bring controversial projects before the
public eye and may result in wiser use of public resources. 30 4 A
second look may also encourage cooperation between governmental entities that might otherwise plan and carry out projects in
30 5
disregard of conflicting programs.
Despite the increased costs and delays that the additional review will entail, a second look at proposed condemnations of protected agricultural land is justified in light of the importance of
farmland preservation programs. As the split of opinion in cases
involving conflicts between zoning and eminent domain suggests, 30 6 however, the judiciary cannot be expected to provide the
impetus for the balancing of interests that such a second look will
require. Instead, agricultural districting and conservation ease30 7
ment statutes must be drafted to require that "second look."
To protect land in agricultural districts and conservation
easements effectively, the statutes enacting these programs
should not ignore the question of eminent domain, nor should
they allow condemnation of the protected farmland to occur without justification. At the very least, the condemning authority
should be required to justify a public need for the proposed project, and to demonstrate both that alternative sites have been considered and that those alternative sites are not satisfactory. This
requirement should apply to all condemnations that could affect
30 8
the protected land adversely.
Statutes that protect selected parcels of farmland should ensure that this second look at proposed condemnations is thorough by providing an appropriate review procedure. Timely
notice to the state department of agriculture (or an analogous
agency) and to the agency that supervises the farmland protection
304. See Note, supra note 154, at 810.
305. Id. at 795.
306. Compare MetropolitanSanitary Dist., 48 Ill.
2d 11, 268 N.E.2d 428 (power
of eminent domain is inherently superior to zoning power) with Brownfield, 63
Ohio St. 2d 282, 407 N.E.2d 1365 (applying test weighing general public purposes served by the exercise of each power). For a discussion of these two cases,
see supra notes 291-99 and accompanying text.
307. The recommendations that follow are drawn from various statutes that
are discussed in detail earlier in this article. For a discussion of these statutes,
see supra notes 178-217 and accompanying text. The source of each individual
recommendation in this section is not noted.
308. The recommendations intended to restrict condemnation of protected
agricultural land are geared toward eminent domain actions of states and their
delegated subunits. State statutes may not prevent condemnations by the federal government. See Dau, supra note 118, at 151.9-20 (explaining the supremacy
of federal public use over all other uses).
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program should be required. If a preliminary review of the proposed project, preferably by a statewide farmland protection
agency, indicates that the condemnation will have unreasonably
adverse effects on the protected agricultural land, the condemnation should be delayed long enough to permit a public hearing
and careful investigation.
After the hearing and a careful review, the reviewing agency
should balance the competing interests. Among the factors that
should be considered are the condemning entity's need to use the
protected farmland, the type of project proposed, the project's
compatibility with agricultural land uses, the extent of potential
damage to protected farmland (both to individual parcels and to
the farmland preservation program itself), the existence or lack of
alternatives, and the cost.30 9 In considering these and other relevant factors, the reviewing agency should weigh the interests of
the condemning entity, the farmland preservation program, and
society at large. This balancing process should result in a written
report explaining the agency's rationale. The agency should recommend that the project be permitted as proposed, permitted
with modifications, or not permitted.
Although this procedure will ensure the balancing of the various interests involved, it still may not prevent condemnation even
if the agency recommends that the proposed project not be permitted. Thus, the statute should also require that the recommendation be considered by the public agency with ultimate authority
over the condemnation. An even more effective approach would
be to prescribe that the recommendation be entered as a final order of the reviewing agency, and as such, be subject to judicial
review. This approach would shift the burden of appeal to the
condemnor3 10 and thereby avoid the situation in which an unfavorable recommendation is ignored by the condemnor. Alterna309. For a list of several fundamental considerations a court should employ
when resolving analogous conflicts between governmental functions and local
zoning ordinances, see Note, supra note 289, at 883-84.
California's farmland protection program includes a provision that states:
"No public agency or person shall locate a public improvement within an agricultural preserve based primarily on a consideration of the lower cost of acquiring land in an agricultural preserve." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51292 (West 1983).
310. In dealing with the analogous conflict between eminent domain and
zoning, one author has proposed a "rebuttable presumption of governmental
nonimmunity from local zoning regulation." Note, supra note 289, at 884. The
presumption could be overcome by showing that the proposed function is critical to the local community or to a broader community, that alternative sites have
been considered, and that the proposed site is least destructive to land-use plans
and adjoining property. Id.
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tively, the statute could require that proposed condemnations
that receive unfavorable recommendations proceed only upon
certification of the governor or an appropriate state agency.
Neither of these approaches would totally prohibit the exercise of
eminent domain and thus run afoul of the inalienability problems
discussed above. Yet each would ensure careful consideration-a
"second look"-before protected land is condemned.
When a farmland preservation statute authorizes the conveyance of conservation easements or development rights to a state
or local agency, rather than to a private organization, even more
stringent protection might be in order. This enhanced protection
may be justified by the permanent nature of these programs and
by the ownership interest that the state or local agency enjoys in
the agricultural land. Here, the statute should be drafted to prevent all but the most critical condemnations. A provision prohibiting condemnation absent a showing of extreme need and lack of
viable alternatives would impose this heavier burden on the condemning agency. Such a showing should be documented in a review process similar to that suggested above, but the balancing of
interests should reflect the heavier burden required to justify the
proposed condemnation. An unfavorable recommendation
should be conveyed in a final agency order subject either to appeal in the courts or to an overriding decision by the governor.
V.

CONCLUSION

Some of the state statutes establishing agricultural districts
or authorizing conservation easements have included provisions
similar to those recommended here. But even those statutes
demonstrating legislative consideration of the question of eminent domain fall short of the optimal levels of review. A state
committed to the preservation of farmland, either in the immediate future or for succeeding generations, should be willing to
commit the relatively insignificant additional time and resources
needed to ensure that protected agricultural land can be taken for
other conflicting public uses only after careful consideration of
the competing interests. To permit condemnation without this
careful review is to diminish the import of otherwise effective
farmland protection statutes. 3 1 '
311. Since this article was typeset, the Illinois legislature has amended the
Illinois Agricultural Areas Conservation and Protection Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
5, §§ 1001-1020 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984). See Pub. Act 84-456, 1985 11. Legis.
Serv. 662 (West). Several of the amendments are of particular interest. The
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minimum size of a district has been reduced from 500 to 350 acres. Id. at 663.
Use of land within an agricultural area is restricted to agricultural production
and limited mining operations. Id. The amended law provides that there shall
be no restrictions on buying and selling land in an agricultural area, and that the
area designation will not be affected by a change in ownership. Id. at 666. The
amended statute will include some additional reporting requirements. Id. Pub.
Act 84-456 becomes effective January 1, 1986. Id.
For a discussion of the Illinois agricultural areas law prior to the 1985
amendment, see supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
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